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The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this paper are entirely those of the author(s)
and  should  not  be  attributed  in  any  manner  to  the  World  Bank,  to  its  affiliated  organizations  or  to
members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent.Abstract
A  legacy  of the  command  economy  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  is  a  social
protection  system that emphasizes institutional care for vulnerable individuals.  It has been well established  that in
many  cases  institutionalization  can  be more  expensive  per client  served  and produce  inferior welfare  outcomes
than  more  inclusive  approaches  designed  to  support  individuals  within  their  families  and  communities.  But
countries  seeking  to change  the model  of services  face  a number of financial  constraints,  including  redirecting
resources away from  institutions.  How can countries  develop the new programs in an affordable  manner?  How
should they change the financing flows to support the new options, without putting the burden of financing  on the
vulnerable  themselves?  The  objective  of this paper  is to provide  a  framework  to help  countries  re-orient  their
financing  systems  for social care.  The paper first reviews  key concepts  in social care  financing  and then applies
them to the problem of changing social care models in ECA countries.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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One of the legacies of the command  economy in Central and Eastem  Europe and the former  Soviet Union
is  the development  of a  social protection  system  for vulnerable  individuals  focused  on institutional  care.  It has
been  well established  that  the approach  of removing a child or  an  adult from the  family and  the  community is
more expensive per client served than more inclusive approaches which are designed to support individuals within
their  own  families  and communities,  main  streaming  them  as  much  as  possible.  Institutional  approaches  also
produce  worse outcomes than community-based  approaches  for most individuals.
Countries  seeking  to change  the  model  of social protection  services  have faced  a number  of constraints.
Financing  new  programs  requires  first  and  foremost redirecting  resources  away  from  institutions.  If countries
want to develop  the  supply  of new  programs,  how  can they  do so in an affordable  manner?  How should they
change  the  financing  flows  to support  a menu  of new  options,  better tailored  to the  needs  of individuals  and
without putting the burden of financing on the vulnerable people?
The objective of this paper is to provide a framework to help countries re-orient their financing systems  for
social care, so that they can implement a change program for the social care system.  The ultimate objective is that
countries  use  more  family-based  and  inclusive  care  programs,  and  use  institutional  care  as a last resort,  thus
supporting  families  to  care  for  their  vulnerable  members  rather  than  place  them  in  residential  care  programs.
Family-based  and inclusive  care programs  are generally  more effective  in meeting  social needs and,  at least on  a
unit cost basis, less expensive.
Changing  the  financing  system  - although  necessary  --  is  not  sufficient  to  achieve  the  goal  of less
institutionalization.  Other components of a change program would include reforms to ensure quality of provision
such as standards  and accreditation, training, information to clients,  monitoring,  etc., and those which improve  the
gatekeeping  and needs assessment  process, including rigorous  outcome  and impact  evaluation.  The effectiveness
of the  financing  framework  in  doing  its job  is  determined  in  part by  the  effectiveness  of these  other  policy
reforms.'  This paper:  (a)  reviews key concepts  in social  care financing;  and (b) applies them  to the problem  of
changing social  care models in ECA countries.
SOCIAL CARE FINANCING  CONCEPTS
What  are social  care services?  Social  care services  are  services  supplied  to  vulnerable  individuals  and
families  to help them out of poverty and exclusion,  and live a full and satisfying life.  Vulnerable  individuals  are
usually considered  to be disabled,  frail elderly,  people  at risk of abuse  or deprivation of basic needs,  or  children
deprived of parental care or mistreated in their family.
Social  care  services  are  a  support  for  everyday  living.  They  should  be  a  complement  to:  (a)  services
provided  by families,  and (b)  other public services  (health  care,  education,  housing, employment  assistance  and
training,  etc.  justice,  etc.).  A broad range  of services  may be  provided.  Institutional  care  is  only  one  of the
possible products,  and it should be used very infrequently.
What is the public sector role?  Families  usually do not have the financial  resources to buy these  services
or to provide them directly.  They often need professional advice on choosing the service package (as with health
care).  In  principal,  social  care  services  could  be privately  insurable.  However,  there  are  major  problems  in
' Concept papers on reforming gatekeeping  and developing standards are also available.  See Bilson and Gotestam (2002) and
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developing  an insurance market  in this  sector, including the classic  insurance  problems of adverse  selection and
moral  hazard.  Vulnerability tends to be correlated  with poverty, so the demand is greatest among those least able
to afford insurance - implying that some public subsidy is needed.  It has been observed that as national income
increases,  the  demand  for these public  finance  for these  services  increases.  Public  finance  is  seen as the best
substitute  for inefficient and ineffective  private insurance markets.
Public finance for social care services  immediately creates problems  of rationing.  The public sector has to
ration  the  financing  available,  prioritizing  needs  and  resources  so that public  financing  is directed  to ensuring
access to services for those with the greatest need, and to those services that produce the best outcomes.  If a good
rationing  system is not  in place,  those  most in need are  likely  to find themselves  without  services.  Rationing
requires  technical  knowledge  and training  to perform  the needs assessment  and service matching,  and often the
assistance of  a  social worker or other  trained specialist  is needed to select the service and monitor the result.  In
the case of children,  especially children  deprived  of parental care, social care almost always requires  someone to
act on the child's behalf.  This person  is called an agent for the individual  or family in need (the principaO. The
agent acts as one of the gatekeepers to the system, rationing care.
The public  sector  plays  a major role  in  organizing  the  supply  of services.  This  is  done  by either:  (a)
directly  supplying the  service;  (b)  contracting  out the  supply  of the  service  to  a  monopolist  private  or  NGO
supplier  according  to  service standards;  and/or  (c)  by setting  standards  for service provision  by  a competitive
private sector.
What is the role of the financing  framework? The financing  framework has a critical  role in regulating the
supply and demand for social care services.  A good financing framework:
o  ensures that demand,  as determined by the gatekeeper and the agent or the individual,  is financed so that
care  is  rationed  properly,  so  that those  most  in need  receive  access  to  services  which  have  the  high
benefits,  and
o  provides incentives so that the providers  supply services efficiently and at a high quality.
In other words, one of the key tasks of the financing system is to try to align the incentives of the system.  The
financing  framework is one of the key public policy tools to ensure access, cost-effectiveness and quality in the
social services.  Put  into  a  comprehensive  framework  of reform  that  also  contains  an  effective  gatekeeping
function and standards for care, an improved financing  framework  has the potential to improve the social care and
service system.
What kinds of  fiunancing  frameworks are &used  for social care?  Three  models  can be  considered - two
extremes and a middle ground.
o  No public role.  This occurs when there is no public involvement in the financing of social care  services
(which usually means no public  provision either).  This solution has the advantage  of consumer choice,
but complete  private finance and provision results in an under-consumption  of social services as well as a
lower  outcomes  because:  (a)  those  most  in  need  would  not  be  able  to  afford  the  services,  and  (b)
households  and individuals  in many  cases do not have  the information  to match services  with needs,  or
they may have  a conflict  of interest (in the  case of a child in need of protection  from domestic violence,
for example).
o  ]Public finance through provisioDn. The  purely  public  solution  - public  finance  through  government
provision  -- is the  simplest  way to ensure  that affordable  services  are provided  to  populations  in need.
The problem  with  this method  is that available  resources are  allocated  not among  people  in need,  but
among providers.  There  is no balancing  of supply  with need  or demand,  there  is just supply,  withoutRedirecting  Resources to Community Based Services - Executive Summary
choice.  The input determines  the output and the outcome.  There may be an oversupply or undersupply of
services  relative  to  demand.  Quality  problems  may  also  arise  since  the  public  sector  tends  to  face
problems  in sanctioning itself for poor quality, and there are usually limited channels  for community  and
client participation  in quality assurance.  In its most extreme form, the pure public model  substitutes the
public sector for the family.
*  Public  finance through reimbursement for services - the purchaser-provider  approach.  This  model
attempts  to duplicate  the roles  of the  consumer and the  supplier  in the  market  system, but without the
market  failures caused  by inadequate  financing and imperfect  information.  The public  sector retains  the
financing  role, but public  sector finance  is provided  in a more competitive environment,  with more voice
for the consumer.  The public roles described in the above model  are divided into two different functions:
(a)  the  purchaser,  who  finances  and  purchases  care,  and  (b)  the  provider,  who  operates  the  service
delivery  units.  The  job  of the  purchaser  is:  (a)  to  act  as  gatekeeper  or rationer  of public  funds,
determining  eligibility,  and  (b)  in the  case  of more  specialized  services,  to  act  as  the  agent  for  the
principal (the vulnerable individual).  The purchaser  could be any  qualified  official given  responsibility
for this task - a teacher,  social worker,  a child protection officer,  a court, etc.  Fundamentally,  the role of
the purchaser  is to act as an agent for the financier and the client, to ensure that funds  are used to get the
best  outcome  for  the  client.  While  the provider  could  be  a public  agency,  in OECD  countries,  the
provider  is more likely to be a private2 or NGO  provider contracted by the public authority,  an  approach
adopted to bring.increased  client responsiveness  and efficiency.  In transition countries, public providers
are more likely in the initial stages as the private sector is underdeveloped.  The private sector will grow
over time.
What  are the keys  to  success for a purchaser-provider  system?  Experience  in  OECD  and  developing
countries  has  shown  that  purchaser  provider  systems  can  contribute  to  higher  client  satisfaction  and  cost-
efficiency in service delivery if the following are in place.
*  The price the purchaser faces reflects the opportunity cost (true price) of supplying the service, rather than
a subsidized or distorted price.
*  The purchaser is responsible for the financial  consequences of proscribing a  service for the client,  and is
the budget holder for social care services for the population in the catchment area.
*  Private  providers  are  allowed  to  enter  the  market  and  compete  for  public  funds  under  appropriate
licensing arrangements,  with transparent  standards and effective quality monitoring arrangements.
*  Purchasers  assure  market  stability  and  avoid  over  capacity  through  multi-year  sector planning,  block
contracts,  and multi-year  contracts.  Market exit also has to be managed to ensure continuity of care.
What problems  have  emerged  with  purchaser-provider  systems?  While  recognized  as  an  improvement,
these models have not solved  all the problems of equitable and efficient  social service provision.  The job of the
purchaser is complex, including both gatekeeping  and acting on behalf of individuals and families.  The purchaser
is  also  balancing  access  and  quality.  Clear  legislative  intent  on  how  to  handle  these  conflicting  interests  is
helpful, as well  as a strong role for client monitoring.
Problems have emerged  in the contracting  side.  Public sector  suppliers  find it difficult to respond to the new
incentives,  and  seek  subsidies  or  ways  around  the  competitive  process.  Price  setting - a  negotiation  - is not
simple  since  cases  are  often  not  standard.  Setting  prices  and  writing  contracts  requires  full  cost  accounting
systems on the provider  side, as well as good accounting and case management on the purchaser side.  As a result,
2 In this paper, we use the "private" to encompass  any non-publicly owned supplier.  This includes, for example,  foster care
or guardianship  (a self-employed private provider of parenting services) as well as a private tutor, or a private care giver, or a
even a private transportation  company.  It also includes an NGO such as a charitable  foundation or a self-help association.
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introducing  a purchaser  can increase  the management  and admninistrative  workload.  Finally,  it may  take  some
efforts by government to develop the market to avoid the situation of only one bidder.
What happens with political and  fiscal decentralization? The purchaser-provider  framework is well suited
to  a  decentralized  government  structure,  if the  roles  are  assigned  properly,  and  financing  flows  support  the
purchaser-provider  incentive structure.
o  The purchasing level needs adequate financing, and full control of the budget.
O  Roles  which  have  large  economies  of scale,  such  as  quality  monitoring  and  facilities  planning  and
management, should be placed on a high level of government (normally the national level).
How to set eligibility criteria  and budgets for care? Once the institutional  set-up is in place, public financing
policy has  to resolve  the  questions  of:  (a)  how much  financing should be provided,  and  (b)  to  which  services
should it be allocated?  This is the authorizing legal framework which guides the purchaser.  A number of criteria
are used in different countries, and each has its drawbacks.
How much publicfinance should be in place, and should the alocadion differ among households?  There
are  strong  arguments  for  providing  less  than  100%  public  finance  for  care,  especially  for  upper  income
households,  as  it reduces  over-usage  and allows  more  families  to  be  reached.  This  approach  will  not  work,
however, in the face of catastrophic costs  or poorly functioning families unwilling to pay, and when prevention  is
needed.  The  total cost  to the household  (including  the time of household  members)  needs to be considered  in
setting fees and proposing care plans.
How to chose the essential service baskee?  In principle,  the policy  framework  should  encourage  the most
cost-effective  care to be selected.  This  is a  two-dimensional process.  Professional judgments  and best practice
identify  the  care  package  that  is  likely to  give  the  best  outcomes.  But  making  choices  among  needs  is  by
necessity a political decision.  It can be facilitated by needs mapping and good outcome monitoring.
OVERV[EW  OF SOCIL  CARE  PROVISION  IN  IEASTERN  AND  CENTRAL  EUROPE  AND THE  YoRMER  SOVIE'
UNION
The  legacy  from  the  planned  economy  and  Soviet  era  was  to  provide  care  for  vulnerable  citizens  in
residential  institutions.  Today,  most  transition  countries  still  use  this approach.  Spurred  in  part by  increased
poverty  and vulnerability  during the  transition,  the rate of institutionalization has  grown  in  almost all  countries.
Use of community care is growing as well, as countries, mostly with foreign assistance,  implement projects aimed
at replacing  residential  care  - or parts of it - with community based non-residential  alternatives.  Unit costs  for
residential  care appear to  be 34 times as much, indicating  a vast misuse offunds in the current system.
The  incentives for use of residential care  are clear.  The public monopoly provider model  is the dominant
one  in  the  Eastern  and  Central  Europe  and  Central  Asian  (ECA)  region,  even  after  political  and  fiscal
decentralization.  As a result, the system is supply driven.  Municipalities consider  referral to state paid residential
care as free facilities.  Needs assessments are rarely performed - clients are simply assigned to care on the basis of
ad hoc  priorities  (usually  by well-meaning  local  officials).  Residential  institutions  are  financed  on  an  input
budget.  Often, countries  do not know the true cost of care since financial statistics  do not show the full financial
cost.  There is no purchasing function,  little care planning, and weak outcome monitoring.
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IMPLEMENTING  A BETTER FRAMEWORK
Improvement  in  social  care requires  changes  in the  financing  framework,  (complemented  by changes  in  the
systems  for gatekeeping  and  standards).  This does not mean reducing the public's  responsibility  for vulnerable
citizens.  Four main changes have to be made.
*  Purchasing:  A purchasing  organization  should be set up with the  following tasks:  (a)  to assess people's
needs  and  to find  the  appropriate  care  and service  for them,  (b)  work out  a  care  plan,  (c)  manage  the
budget for the care it purchases, rationing care according to policy guidelines,  (d) monitor outcomes,  and
(e) follow the care market, knowing best practice.
*  Budget reforms:  A new budgeting  system needs to be put in place  which places all the public funds for
social  care  in  the hands  of the purchaser,  and allows  for  output-based  reimbursements.  It  should  also
provide adequate  funds for the purchasing  function.
*  Market-making reforms:  Prices to providers have to be based on full opportunity  costs, which are explicit
and  transparent.  Public  and  private  providers  (current  and  potential)  should  submit  to  licensing.
Contracts  between  purchasers  and providers  need  to be  developed  which  regulate  the  what  should  be
achieved at what cost.  These contract forms should be included in tender documents.
*  Provider market  reforms:  The legal  status of existing public  institutions,  as well as the ownership,  may
have to be changed  to allow them to participate  in a tender (and possibly  lose).  The number of places in
residential  care will need to contract, and the community care places need to expand.  The provider sector
needs to be made open to NGOs.
How should the transition be handled?  Making the transition to a new financing  system will be demanding
for  all  stakeholders.  A  number  of  transition  problems  emerge.  Countries  seeking  to  change  the  financing
structure to a purchaser-provider model need to develop a sound project plan.  The plan needs to be based on:
*  an analysis of the current situation, which maps out what the economic  roles are in the current system, the
costs and who pays those costs;
*  a proposed institutional  structure  for new  system,  specifying  new roles, responsibilities,  accountabilities
and financial  flows, and an analysis of the incentives;
*  a needs  assessment, projecting possible future demand  scenarios with  a change in practices towards more
community and family centered care;
*  a costing of the demand  scenarios;
*  a proposed new financial flow structure given (b) and (d);
*  a facilities management plan; and
*  and activity plan for project implementation.
Changing  the financial  rules of the game is not enough  to ensure  better use of public  and private resources
toward  better outcomes.  Much  more is needed.  These  issues  are  dealt with in  other papers in this  series, and
should be part of the overall reform strategy.
What will the transition cost?  The analysis described above should help to answer this question.  The type of
reform program discussed here is not likely to be expenditure reducing, both because:  (a) new investments  will be
needed to develop new services and (b)  the increased  availability of community-based  services will reveal unmet
needs, increasing  demand for those  services.  An atmosphere of fiscal crisis is probably counterproductive  for this
type of reform.  It is difficult to reach agreement  among stakeholders on new roles and responsibilities  as budgets
are being sliced.  It is better to develop the reform plan in line with available financing.  Public demand for social
care  rises  with national  income  (all  other variables constant)  so it is  reasonable  to  expect that  as income  rises,
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social care will absorb a constant or growing share of expenditures.  Reform is, therefore, important,  as it makes it
possible to serve more clients with better quality care and reduce the harm done by residential care.
Is this m&uch change  possible? Managers and political leaderships  work for change once they understand
that better methods  and tools exist.  Frequent intemational  contacts  have  fostered  this awareness  and  develop a
motivation.  Many  of the  features  in  the  new  financing  structure  are  in  fact  already  in  place  or  underway.
Nevertheless,  a reform of this type is a medium term one, and as with any change project, the time  frame has to be
realistic,  and coordinated  with the ability of the system to  change.  It must  also be put into  a larger  framework
including gatekeeping  functions and appropriate standards for care delivery.
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INTRODUCTION
One  of the legacies  of the command  economy in Central and Eastem Europe and the former  Soviet Union
(in  World  Bank  terminology,  the  Europe  and  Central  Asia  or  ECA  region)  is  the  development  of a social
protection  system  for  vulnerable  individuals  focused  on  institutional  care.  Universal  social  protection  was
provided  to families in the form of a guaranteed job and old-age pension,  as well as child allowances  and benefits
in kind such as housing,  education,  and  health care.  If an individual  needed help beyond this  level of universal
support, and an  institutional  place  was available, this is what was offered to the family -- to children  and adults.
Families,  in turn were  encouraged  to  use  institutional  care,  instead  of trying to keep  the  family  member  in the
community and participating  in school, work, or leisure, alongside  others.
It  has been well  established  that the  approach  of removing a child  or  an adult  from  the  family  and  the
community  is more  expensive per  client served  than more  inclusive  approaches  which  are designed  to  support
individuals  within  their  own  families  and  mainstreaming  them  as  much  as  possible  (Tobis,  2000).  Countries
seeking to change the model of social care  services have faced a number of constraints.  An important one is how
to finance new services.  Individuals or their families usually can not finance  the costs of these services.  How can
countries  change  the financing  flows to support a menu of new options, better tailored to the needs of individuals
and without putting the burden of financing on the vulnerable people?
Reform of the social protection system in formerly planned economies is taking place within the context of
a  number  of  social  and  economic  changes,  including  fiscal  and  political  decentralization.  Ideally,  this
decentralization  offers  a  good  context  for  reform,  as  it  can  provide  communities  with  the  resources  and
responsibilities  to  ensure  that  quality  services  are  available  to  meet  their  needs.  In  practice,  it  has  been  a
challenge,  since  implementation  has not  always  had  this effect.  Often,  facilities  are  decentralized  rather  than
resources,  and  a  market  for  services  does not  exist.  Local  governments  end  up using  the  institution  they are
responsible  for rather than empowering families to solve the problems  using new approaches and tools.  The more
money that goes to the institution,  the less money is available  for providing other services  or serving more people.
Meeting community needs requires breaking this cycle.
The objective of this paper is to provide a framework to help countries re-orient their financing systems for
social care,  so that they can implement a change program for the social care system.  The ultimate objective  is that
countries  use  less institutional  care and more family-based  and inclusive care  programs.  The  latter programs are
generally more effective in meeting social needs and, at least on a unit cost basis, less expensive.
' This paper has been prepared as part of a  joint UNICEF-World Bank project, "Changing Minds,  Policies and Lives",  a
program designed to support national programs  to reduce the institutionalization  of vulnerable  individuals in  Eastern and
Central Europe  and Central Asia.  For further information about this regional project,  see http:lt eurochi1d.Rla.ac.ukJchanain.
The authors  are grateful for the extensive comments  of Gaspar Fajth, Judith Harwin, Loraine Hawkins  and, as well as from
project  team members.  Comments to the authors are welcome  at Ifox(aworldbank.org  (Fox) or ragnar.gotestamrr2chello.se
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This  paper  is  about the  theory  and  practice  of changing the  financing  flows  away  from  institutions  to
support  reform of social  care  systems.  Taking the age-old  advice,  "follow the money",  we  start by reviewing
what  a  good  financing  policy  should  do.  We  consider  three  concepts:  (a)  need  for services,  (b)  demand  for
services,  and (c)  supply of services.  We note that a public role is needed in the first place because  those in need
often  cannot  afford  to purchase  their own  services.  In addition,  clients need specialized  help identifying which
services  would work for them and they need quality assurance.
We look at how a the institutional  structure of the public  financing framework  can use incentives  to help
balance these three concepts,  getting a high overlap so that what is supplied meets the needs which are accepted
by the community  as appropriate  for public  finance.  We suggest that countries  do this by clearly separating  the
purchase  (selection  and financing)  of care  from the provision  of care,  and we recommend  that this  institutional
approach be used to develop an appropriate role for the private sector.
In  section  II,  we examine  what  is going on  in specific  countries.  We  ask what  are  the  needs  for  social
protection  services, what kind of care is currently being  supplied in selected  countries  in the  ECA region, what it
costs,  and who is paying  for it.  We use the yardstick set out in the first section  to evaluate the current situation.
How  well  is the financing  framework allocating  resources  relative to needs  and demands?  We find that  input-
based financing  is still the main source of financing in most countries,  hampering the desired shift in service and
product mix.
We then look at what policy measures  countries need to undertake  to change  the financing  mix, and what
are the problems in realizing this transition.
Changing  the financing  system is a necessary,  but not sufficient  condition to achieving  the goal  of better
social  care services.  A system  wide change program  is needed.  Other  components  of a  change  program would
include reforms to ensure quality of provision such as standards and accreditation,  training, infornation to clients,
monitoring,  etc.,  and  those  which improve  the  gatekeeping  and  needs assessment  process,  including  rigorous
outcome  and impact evaluation.  The effectiveness  of the  financing  framework  in doing  its job is  determined  in
part by the effectiveness of these other policy tools.'
See Harwin  and Bilson (2000) and Bilson and Gotestam (2000).
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PART I:  WHAT SHOULD A SOCIAL CARE SERVICE FINANCING FRAMEWORK DO?
Social  care  services  are  services  supplied  to  vulnerable  individuals  and  families  to  help  them  out  of
poverty and exclusion, and live a full and satisfying life.  Vulnerable  individuals are  usually considered to be:
*  Children  (minors)  and  adults  with  serious  disabilities  (temporary  or  permanent),  including  the  frail
elderly,
*  Children (minors)  or adults at risk of abuse or deprivation of basic needs, and
*  Children  (minors)  deprived  of parental  care  (usually  because  of absence,  illness  including  disabling
addiction, or death of parents) or at risk of deprivation of parental  care.
Social care  services  are  a support for  everyday  living.  They complement  support provided  by families.
They  should  also  be  a  complement  to  other  social  services  (health  care,  education,  housing,  employment
assistance  and training,  etc.), as well  as a support to other public services (justice,  etc.).  Indeed, encounters  with
other services  often trigger the needs assessment of the client and referral to care services.  The objective of social
care services may be prevention of the deprivation of human  rights or well-being or the correction of the problem.
In some cases, social  care  services replace other social services.  This is especially  true of residential care.
As a general  rule, replacement  of other services  in a specialized  institution is more expensive  and leads to poorer
outcomes  in terms of inclusion, functionality,  and well-being.
Families of these vulnerable  groups  are also at risk.  They are at risk primarily because the individual  risk
factors  include  poverty or are correlated  with poverty,  but also because  these factors  can  lead  to emotional and
social  stress within  the family2. This  reduces the ability of the  family to support  all members.  Social  services
should have the outcome of reducing the stress in the family, as well as supporting the individual.
IDENTIFYING THE PUBLIC SECTOR ROLE IN SOCIAL CARE SERVICE PROVISION
Needs and demand.  Historically  families  have  provided  most  social  care  services  themselves.  For
example, children helped other children  and adults to go about daily living,  and adults would take care of a family
member not able to work,  or give special  attention to a child.  Extended  family networks  would help  sub-family
units  in crisis  by giving  transfers  in  cash  or in kind,  and  with  emotional  support.  Religious  groups  and  other
charities  would  often  provide  help  as  well.  Richer families  would  hire  services  (for example,  a  care taker  for
someone with mobility problems or a teacher for home schooling for a child with special needs).
As  the  workplace  increasingly  moved  outside  the  home,  formal  labor force  participation  increased,  and
extended family networks fragmented, the opportunity cost of family labor to take  care of members in need grew.
In addition, new knowledge and technologies  spurred the development of new, professional,  and often higher cost
services.  Families usually do not have the financial resources  to buy these services.  They often need professional
advice on choosing the service package (as with health care).
In  principal,  social  care  services  could  be privately  insurable  - and  in  countries  with  a  well  developed
private insurance  sector,  some risks  are  insured for upper  income  sections  of the  population  (for example,  long
term nursing care for the elderly).  However, there are major problems  in developing an insurance  market in this
sector.3 First,  vulnerability tends to be correlated with poverty, so the demand  is greatest among those least able
2 See for example, UNICEF (1997)  on poverty and vulnerability among children at risk, and Elwan,  (1999), for a discussion
of the links between disability and poverty.
3  Barr, 2001, develops this argument more fully, esp. in chapter 3.
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to afford  insurance.  Without  enforced risk pooling,  there is  a serious  adverse  selection4 problem  which  would
make premiums  completely unaffordable.S  Moral  hazard problems (increased  consumption of the  service in the
presence  of insurance)6 is also  a problem in the case of social care services.  Yet social care services  are valuable
to  families  and  to  society,  since  society  wants  to  protect  and  support  the  vulnerable.  As  national  income
increases,  the demand  for public  finance for these  services  increases  (Barr,  2001;  Lindert,  1996).  Public  finance
is seen as the best substitute for inefficient and ineffective private markets.
Public finance  for social care  services immnediately  creates problems of rationing.  Needs of households  for
free or subsidized services  can be considered  virtually unlimited.  However,  financing  is not unlimited (public or
private).  The public  sector has to ration the financing  available, prioritizing  needs and  resources so  that public
financing  is directed  to ensuring  access to  services  for those with  the greatest need,  and to those  services that
produce  the best outcomes.  If a good  rationing  system  is  not in place,  those  most  in need are  likely  to  find
themselves without services.
A broad range  of services may be provided.  Institutional  care is only one of the possible products,  and it
should  be  used  very  infrequently.  More  family-friendly  services  include  day  programs,  temporary  shelters,
counseling and family support,  transportation  services, prosthesis,  special health or education services  or training,
etc.  Typically,  it is more  cost effective  to prevent  a problem  than to correct it,  although the boundary  between
preventive  services  and corrective  services  is porous.'  The  cost  of these  services  varies,  as  does the  quality,
depending  on how production is organized and what technology and methods are used.  Some products work well
for some needs but not others.
Rationing  services  and  matching  them  to  clients  is not  a  simple  problem.  It  usually  requires  technical
knowledge  and  training  to perform  the needs  assessment  and service  matching.  In some  cases,  the family  can
select and  purchase  the  service  and be responsible  for monitoring the results,  and the  role of the government  is
limited  to  assisting  with  financing  based  on  a  needs  assessment  (assessing  eligibility).  In  other  cases,  the
assistance  of social worker or other trained specialist is needed to select the service and monitor the result.  In the
case of children,  especially  children deprived of parental care, social  care almost always requires someone to act
on the  child's  behalf.  This person  is called  an agent for the  individual or family  in need (the  principal).  The
agent  acts  as  one  of the  gatekeepers  to  the  system,  rationing  care. 8 All  participants  in  the system  need  the
specialized  knowledge  of the  agent.  However,  most of the  system  management  problems  occur  around  the
conflicting  interests of the principal and the fmancier, as intermediated through the agent.
Supply.  Because of the difficulty in ensuring an adequate supply of quality services,  in most countries,  the
public sector plays a major role in organizing the supply of services.  This is done by either: (a) directly supplying
the  service;  (b) contracting  out the supply  of the service  to a monopolist private or NGO  supplier  according to
4Adverse selection occurs when the risks are identifiable in advance, and mainly the highest risk people buy an insurance
product.  This results in a very high price for the product, and then the insurance becomes unaffordable.  The solution is to
force everyone (or most people) to buy the product, so that the price is lower and 'the risk spread out.  Mandatory auto
insurance  is an example of this type of risk pooling.
5  See, for example,  Aarts and de Jong (1999)  for a discussion of which private costs associated with disability are insurable,
when, and by whom.  Birth-related disabilities are particularly difficult to insure, since the insurance  would rarely be
purchased voluntarily in advance of the risk.  Low probability, high cost events are also hard to get people to purchase
insurance for.
6 Moral hazard is  common in personal services.  In health care, for example, if going to the clinic is free,  people go more
often,  sometimes even when a visit is not strictly necessary, but because they are lonely or unsure.  Co-payments  (charging a
smnall fee) are the standard remedy, but these can cause access problems.  Over-consumption of medicine when it free is
another common moral hazard behavior.  Counseling services are also subject to this problem, and the usage needs to be
strictly limited.
7 For example, a class on effective parenting for young mothers and families can be considered preventive or corrective.
8 See paper  Harwin and Bilson,  (2002).
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service  standards;  and/or  (c) by  setting standards  for service  provision by a competitive  private  sector (usually,
but not exclusively, non-profit).  The public sector also helps families to monitor results, and conducts research  on
techniques and approaches, to encourage the development and supply of new and cost-effective  models.
Thus there are three distinct aspects of social care service delivery which have to be balanced:
*  the needs of households  and vulnerable  individuals for assistance or support (the needs of the principal);
*  the identification  of appropriate  and affordable  interventions  and prioritization  of funding to families  and
individuals for the interventions  given costs and effectiveness (demand,  often involving an agent who acts
on behalf of the principal  and a gatekeeper who works on behalf of the financier according to norms and
laws); and
*  the supply of the services  efficiently, at a high quality (providers).
The role of the financing  framework  is to balance these three  aspects.  A good financing  framework does
this by:
*  ensuring  that demand, as deterrnined  by the gatekeeper  and the agent or the individual,  is financed so that
care is rationed properly, according  to agreed  criteria, so that those most in need receive  access to services
which have the high benefits, and
*  provide incentives so that the providers supply services efficiently and at a high quality.
In other words, one of the key tasks of the financing  system  is to try to align the incentives of the system
participants  so that the  interests  of the  individual  and  society are  served  efficiently.  These  interests  are  often
different, as can be seen in Table 1.
The financing  framework is therefore one of the key public  policy tools to ensure access, cost-effectiveness
and quality in the social  services.  These are the assessment criteria for any framework.  As we will see below, the
most effective way to do this is to provide a separate  channel or voice for the interests of each of the three parties
to be articulated,  so that they can be balanced.  Especially important is the voice of the client, since he/she tends to
have the least power in the system yet is most important in solving the problem.  Inclusive problem resolution  is
difficult unless the client agrees with the solution or at least understands it.  Other complementary  tools to achieve
this  balance  include  those  which  ensure  quality  of provision  such  as  standards  and  accreditation,  training,
information to clients,  monitoring,  etc.,  and those which improve  the gatekeeping  and needs assessment  process,
including rigorous outcome and impact evaluation.  The effectiveness  of the  financing framework in doing its job
is determined in part by the effectiveness of these other policy tools.
FINANCING  MODELS
Organizing  a financing  framework  which supports  efficient and  effective social  care provision is primarily
about institutional  structures.  What are the roles and responsibilities  of institutions in social care  system?  If a key
role is unfilled - or mixed up with another,  so that there  is a conflict of interest - fewer people will be served,  they
will be served less well,  and resources are likely to be wasted.  Below we discuss several ways this can occur in
conventional  financing models.
No public role - access  and quality failure.  This occurs when there is no public financing of social care services,
only  private  financing.  In  most cases,  this would  imply no public provision as well.  In  the absence  of public
sector  involvement,  there  would  be  no  agent  for  the  principal  and  no  gatekeeper  - households  would  either
provide  the  services  themselves  (family  care)  or  purchase  services  from providers  just  like  cars  or meals  in
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restaurants are purchased.9 This was the case for most countries  100 years ago, and remains the situation  today in
many  of the world's  poorest countries.  In this  case plenty of channels  exist  for  information about demands  to
providers,  and competition  could produce  a variety of services if households  have money to purchase them.  But
there would be few  channels of information  about needs, since those in need may not have the funds to channel
money into demands.  As we noted above, this approach would result in an under-consumption  of social services
as  well  as lower  outcomes  because:  (a)  those  most in need  would  not be  able  to  afford  the  services,  and  (b)
households and individuals in many cases do not have the information to match services with needs, or they may
have  a  conflict of interest  (in the  case  of a child  in need of protection  from domestic  violence,  for example).
Because  of a  thin market,  there could also be an under-supply  of services.  If there  is no quality regulation  (for
example, certification  of providers),  high cost, high quality providers  might not enter the market since they would
have to compete with poor quality but cheaper services.  Economists call this type of problem a "market failure".
In  a  market  economy,  the  public  sector  should  try  to remedy  this  failure  with  public  resources  to  increase
consumption,  and with regulation to improve quality.
Table  1L:  Needs,  Demand and Supply
Needs (client)  Demiand (fInancier)  Splv (provider)
Who observes?  Point of entry person:  Office in charge of  Everyone in the market
health worker, teacher,  supporting families to
police, social worker,  cope or - if needed -
day nursery staff, family.  referning individuals to
Client can self-identify  care (the gatekeeper  and
the agent).
How determined?  Revealed by client  Revealed by public and  The quantity and quality of
through needs  private financiers  services supplied by the
assessment  (review of  through the budget  providers.
situation and  allocations- the total
communication with the  envelope available to
individual  or family at  spend on meeting needs,
risk).  and - the priority or
rationing plan used by
the gatekeeper (set in
legal norms).
How measured and  Outcome measurement - Budgets and care plan  Output measurement - the
evaluated?  the result for the  procedures.  quality-adjusted  quantity of
individual  services  relative to the price
Policy tools  Outreach,  targeting  Legislation  sets  Cost accounting, Quality
eligibility thresholds,  monitoring (standards)
targets,  and financing
responsibilities; budget
_ sets total financing
9This is a bit of a simplification.  Even in pure market system,  an agent might still be needed to develop a care plan and make
recommendations  on services.  However, most likely, the supplier would include this in the package, biasing results toward
the services provided.  In the case of private insurance,  a gatekeeper  would automatically be present to control moral hazard.
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Public financing through direct budget financing of public units - quality failure.  In  the  centrally
planned  economy,  the  problem  of  financing  is  solved  through  the  government  itself  delivering  a  supply  of
services which  are rationed  to the population in need by an  agent/gatekeeper.  Available  resources are  allocated
not among people in need, but among providers.  The problem with this approach is that since the agent works for
the supplier,  there  is no independent  channel  for information about needs  or demands.  There is no balancing  of
supply  with  need  or  demand,  there  is just  supply,  without  choice.  The  input  determines  the  output  and  the
outcome.  There  may be and  oversupply  or undersupply  or services  relative  to demand.  But this  is  unknown,
since there is no independent voice for demand.  There are only needs, and services.  The incentives are mostly on
the  side  of the providers.  Quality  problems  may  also  arise  since  the  public  sector  tends  to  face  problems  in
sanctioning itself for poor quality, and there are usually limited channels  for community and client participation in
quality  assurance,  through choice  and  independent  feedback.  In  its  most extreme  form,  the pure  public model
substitutes the public sector for the family.
The purely public solution is, however,  the simplest way to ensure that services are provided to populations
in need.  All market economies have used this approach  at some point to ensure social sector service supply meets
demand, including health,  education and social care services.  This approach  has come under criticism (see Torres
and Mathur,  1995; OECD,  1997;  Preker, Harding, Girishankar,  1999, and the references  therein).  In addition to
the problems above, it may not produce  the best services  most efficiently,  since the monopolist faces no pressures
from other competitors.  Public  service  "culture"  is often not client oriented.  Dissatisfaction with public  sector
provision  has been termed  "public  sector failure".  Countries have been  seeking a way  out of the bind between
public monopoly with public sector failure  and no public financing or provision with private market failure.
Public financing through reimbursement  for services - purchaser-provider  models.  The  result of this
searching  has  been  the  evolution  of the  "purchaser-provider"  model.  This  model  uses  the  natural  quality
improvement  mechanism which arises from the tension between  the roles  of the consumer  and the supplier  in a
market system,  but without the access failure resulting  from only private  financing.  It starts by recognizing  that
the public  intervention  should be to  fix the problems on the demand side - inadequate  financing and information
in  families.  These  problems  can be  corrected  through public financing,  agency,  and  quality monitoring.  In the
simplest  case  the  public  sector  may  still  be  responsible  for the  same  roles  as  in the  public  provision  model.
However,  these  roles  are  separated  into  two  different  functions  performed  by  two  different  agencies:  (a) the
purchaser,  who  finances  and purchases  care,  and (b)  the provider,  who  operates the service  delivery units.  The
job of the purchaser  is:  (a) to act as gatekeeper  or rationer  of public  funds, determining  eligibility, and (b) in the
case of more specialized services,  to act as the agent for the principal (the vulnerable  individual).  The purchaser
uses  public  financing  (or  a  mix  of public  and  private  financing)  to  purchase  services  from  suppliers  for
individuals.  The  purchaser  could be  any qualified  official  given responsibility  for this task - a teacher,  social
worker, a child protection officer, a court, etc.  Fundamentally,  the role of the purchaser  is to act as an agent for
the financier  and  the client,  to ensure  that funds  are  used to  get the best outcome  for the  client.  This  implies
seeking  the  highest  value  for  money,  and  ensuring  as  much  access  as  the  financial  envelope  affords.  The
purchaser-provider  approach is also know as  "money follows  the  client" (as opposed to the money following the
supplier).
While  the provider  could  be  a public  agency,  in  OECD  countries,  the  provider  is more  likely  to  be  a
private'  or  NGO  provider  contracted  by  the  public  authority,  an  approach  adopted  to bring  increased  client
responsiveness and efficiency.2 One of the strengths of the purchaser-provider  model is that it allows a market for
providers to emerge, gaining the benefits  from competition.  In a full purchaser-provider  system, multiple private
In this paper, we use the "private" to encompass any non-publicly owned supplier.  This includes, for example, foster care
or guardianship (a self-employed private provider of parenting  services) as well as a private tutor, or a private care giver, or a
even a private transportation company.  It also includes an NGO such as a charitable  foundation or a self-help association.
2  But if the private supplier is still the only provider, contracting out still lacks the feature of consumer choice.
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providers  supply care  to clients,  allowing  a full  articulation of client need within the financing framework.  The
public  sector role is to provide and ration the financing (in other words, to universally  insure the population).
The public sector still maintains the role of quality assurance.  This role is exercised both through  standard
setting and licensing,  and through monitoring of standards  and outcomes.  Client groups can be tasked to assist in
the  monitoring,  as  can  self-regulating  organizations  such  as professional  bodies.  The  public  sector  can  also
educate clients as consumers,  in some cases reducing the role of the purchaser  to needs assessment and financing
channel, while the client selects and evaluates  the provider.3
Purchaser-provider  models  have  a number  of advantages.  First,  they allow  a clearer  transmission  of demand
signals  to the provider,  which can improve  efficiency  on the supply  side.  Second,  they allow the separation  of
needs  assessment  and  financing  from  provision,  giving  voice  and power to this  process, independent  from  the
problem  of service  provision.  Third,  they give  an  explicit  role to the  care  management  process, allowing  the
quality of this function to improve.  Finally, they allow the emergence  of competition  and a market in the service
supply  sector,  which  should improve  quality.  They allow  the public  sector to concentrate  on what are clearly
monopoly public  functions  - quality  regulation and insuring risk in the face of an insurance  market failure - and
the private  sector to produce the services for individuals (within the constraint of public quality regulation  - see
Bilson and Gotestam, (2002) for a discussion).
MAKING THE MARKET WORK
Pricing  and budgeting  are keys  to effective  purchasing.  This means,  first and foremost,  that the pricing
structure the purchaser  faces must reflect the opportunity cost4 of supplying the services.  The price the purchaser
pays  to the supplier must be a fair one, at least the average  cost of supplying the service over the medium term,
including maintaining capital,  service improvements, etc.  If the price is below this cost, the supplier will go out
of business or service levels will decline.5
The  second  key  is  that  "the  one  who decides,  pays".  This  means  the  that  purchasing  organization  must be
responsible for  the financial  consequences  of demanding  a service  for the  client.  The purchaser  must therefore
control  the whole public (or privately insured)  social care budget for a given population,  and be accountable  for
all access issues, as well as the cost-effectiveness  of service decisions.
The third key is that the budget must flow through a "single pipe" to the purchaser.  This means that the
funds available to the purchaser must all come through one channel  - the single pipe.  In other words, the social
worker purchasing  services  should not be  biased by  whether the  funds  come  from  one budget  or another.  No
monies can flow to the providers directly, as this would impede clear price signals and prevent the purchaser  from
seeking the most cost-effective  solution.  Monies flowing directly  to a provider usually results  in a subsidy to  a
provider,  distorting  the price  structure.  User fees  or co-payments  must  also be  consistent  across  substitutable
services.6
3  The "voucher"  or insurance model, with client choice, works best in cases where the diagnosis of the problem is relatively
straight-forward and the outcome is easily observed  such as mobility services or home care  for the elderly or disabled.
Where the outcome is more difficult to observe or the supplier can induce increased demand,  a more extensive  involvement
of the purchaser is needed,  raising more principal-agent  problems.
4 Resources are never free.  Opportunity cost is the cost of the altemate use.  Opportunity cost may not be monetary, and may
not be observed in the market, but it always exists.  For example, public buildings used to supply residential services could
also be used as schools, police stations, or sold and the money used to help poor children.
5  This does that mean that the supplier should get whatever price they propose.  It sirnply means that the prices the purchaser
faces should not be subsidized (by the public sector, for example, in the form of free capital, or by the private sector in the
form of underpricing).
6  For example, if the budget pays 100% of service cost for a public provider but only 75%  for a private provider, the
purchaser's  decision is distorted.  Likewise, if the family has to pay 10% of the cost for home care, but pays nothing for
institutional care, the family may push the purchaser to choose residential  care.
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If these rules are in place, the purchaser (for example,  a social worker)  can theoretically  get the most cost-
effective  allocation  among  all possible  services  for the client,  and use  the budget  to meet the highest priority
needs.  If, however,  there is market or budget segmentation,  these optimizations  will not take place.
While  recognized  as  an improvement,  purchaser-provider  approaches  have not solved all the problems  of
public service provision,  and have created new problems.  First, there is still the problem of needs assessment and
allocation  inherent in the principle/agent problem.  If someone  makes the decisions on service purchase other than
the person in need (that  is,  the client  or the  principal),  what mechanisms  are in place  to assure  that the client's
needs are met as far as possible given limited financing?  In other words, how to be sure that the agent (with their
own interests)  acts properly with respect to the principal  in  a complex  situation?  One method of reducing this
problem is to reduce the role of the agent to a minimum,  and empower the client as much as possible  A market
for providers  within  a  range of standardized  services  can reduce  the danger of misallocation  by the purchaser,
especially if the choice  of provider for the standardized service is left to clients.  Empowering clients also helps to
ensure better  outcomes,  since the client is included  in the treatment decisions.  The  danger is, however,  that full
public  financing combined with weak agency may increase moral hazard (raising the cost).
Allowing choice is not always possible, in the case of children,  for example, or where there is a conflict of
interests  in the household.  In some cases, assessment  of needs and results  is difficult,  and the client will perhaps
make a short term, easy choice, or one without long term benefits.  Effective  outcome monitoring is needed which
tracks the results  of case  'management decisions.7 It is important  that the agency in charge of monitoring not be
the  purchaser.  Consumer/family  roles  in  monitoring  especially  through  advocacy  organizations,  can  be  a
safeguard to balance the purchaser's power.
The second  issue  is how to make  sure that the purchaser rations  care effectively,  using  limited funds.  In
other words, how to make sure that the policy intent in the law is followed with respect to the most needy and the
most at risk?  The  purchaser  is  implicitly  balancing  access  and quality  within  a  fixed  budget,  often  in a  non-
transparent manner.  This  issue is also best addressed through community level monitoring and feedback.  At the
national  level,  community  demographics  compared  with  service  utilization  can  also  provide  information  about
how well the purchasing  function is being performed.
Problems  have emerged  with respect to  the provider  market.  When purchaser/provider  models  are  put in
place,  provision  is usually in the hands of the public sector.  Public  sector agencies  are not always able or willing
to respond  flexibly  to new  demands.  Private providers  may enter the market,  but if the public  sector  does not
shrink  in response there will be an oversupply in the public  sector,  which will push up unit costs  and/or lead to
deficits  in agency budgets.  This is because  empty places have  to be paid and the provider  will add the cost for
these empty places to the bed-day price.  In the face of these  deficits, purchasers  will face pressures to use public
services  over  private  ones.  Experience  has proved  that  the public  sector providers  can use  political  power to
undermine competition  or downsizing.  This issue requires  careful attention.  Exit and transition strategies have to
be formulated in advance to ensure continuity of care.
Market stability is also a key issue.  Investment is required by private or public providers to develop care
programs.  Providers  will only undertake  this investment if they are  assured of a client base.  Clients  also need
continuity,  especially  in the case  of long term care.  Countries have developed  various  methods to resolve  this
problem, including multi-year contracts, block contracts,  etc.  (See box on Stockholm,  below)
Setting prices has  also been  a  problem.  This is  usually a negotiation  between purchasers  and providers.
For the supplier, the price has to equal the long run average cost in order to maintain assets and stay in business.
7For a discussion of outcome monitoring  see Bilson and G6testam, (2002).  It is particularly difficult in the case of social
care services,  since results are usually not directly observed,  but instead inferred from individual behavior.
9Redirecting Resources to Community Based Services
Analyzing  this requires  a  full  cost accounting.  The  purchaser  is seeking  the  lowest price possible  in  order to
maximize value.  Price stability is needed in both markets for the necessary investments to take place.
Prices  are  usually  set  for an  "average"  case.  But individuals  differ,  and  it is not easy  to predict needs.
These vary enormously and therefore also the costs to meet these needs.  A care facility that only attends to clients
with  limited  needs  will  have  less  expenditures  (and  therefore  lower  prices)  than  a  care  facility  that takes  on
demanding cases that need constant attention from staff and expertise.  In a growing market it is easier to find care
options for mildly disabled clients than for severely disabled ones, for example.  A mildly disabled  client is able
to participate in the care, make own efforts and contribute  to his own rehabilitation,  which eases the burden on the
staff and the costs.
Thus  there  is  a limit  to the concept  of cost-effective  purchasing.  Best practice  experiences  are  that one
cannot really  rehabilitate  a  client, just  facilitate  the  client  to  rehabilitate  himself by  providing  the  supportive
conditions.
It  should  be  noted  that  purchaser-provider  models  are  more  expensive  administratively  than  public
monopoly  models,  especially  in  the  case  of multiple  providers.  Does  this  raise  the  total  cost  of  social  care
services, reducing  access?  Not necessarily.  Some  of these  costs will be  offset by gains  in efficiency  stemming
from competition.  In the U.K., the introduction of competition during the  1990s resulted in increased productivity
and  lower  costs,  especially  when  public  entities  are  submitted  to  competition  (F6lster,  1993).  Some  of the
additional  costs observed  with the  introduction  of purchasing  are for  functions  which  need  to be  performed  to
increase  the  value  of care  (improve  outcomes),  such  as better needs  assessment  and  agency  on the  part of the
public  financier,  and  better  quality  regulation.  Often  the budget  of a  public  system  in  the  case  of a  public
monopoly does not reflect the full cost of the  system (e.g. capital charges  and maintenance).  However,  it should
be  recognized  that inserting a  purchaser-provider  model  in a situation  of continued  monopoly will have  limited
efficiency gains compared with the benefits of competition on the provider side.
To  sunmmarize,  vulnerable  individuals  need  social  care  services,  and  societies  want  them to  have  these
services at an affordable  level.  Governments  have to play a role in assuring that these  services  are available  to
those who need them at the required quality level.  This means govermments have to:
o  finance some or all of the costs for some or all or the clients groups,
o  decide  who  should  receive  what  services  with  limnited  public  money,  based  on  good  tools  for  needs
assessment,  careful  evaluation  of results for all clients,  and policies on targeting which  ensure value  for
money in terms  of social  goals  such as preventing deprivation or human rights  violations  and fostering
inclusion; and
o  monitor quality for all services provided (public and private).
Government can do this through direct service provision.  However, to encourage  a more efficient,
flexible,  and  diverse  provider  network,  governments  in  OECD  countries  have  been  introducing
purchaser/provider  financing models.
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Box 1:  Contracting out Residential Care for Children in Iceland
In the early  1990s, the Government of Iceland was concemed about the cost of residential  care for children in
government - owned and operated  facilities.  Costs seemed to rising without a comparable  increase in services  or quality.  As
part of the Government's Competitive  Tendering Initiative,  it was decided in  1993 to experiment with contracting out
management services for a new residential  care home.  After much discussion  on qualifications and standards, a tender was
launched.  Potential  contractors were identified through  advertising, they were ranked according to their qualifications,  and a
contract was signed with the leading candidate following negotiations.
The experiment was judged a success, and as a result,  in 1995,  a purchasing agency was created - the national Child
Protection Agency.  Today, most residential  treatment homes for children  have been contracted out or are being contracted out.
Whenever possible,  former management  is invited to bid.  This preserves  expertise  and contributes to stability of service.
Contracts are usually for two years with  an extension  clause.
A recent evaluation  highlighted the following benefits of the new system:
*  contracting out has added flexibility to the system,  making it more client responsive;
*  unit costs have declined 20%, govemment overhead  costs have also declined,  and budget overruns have been
eliminated; and
*  quality standards are higher owing to the requirement for the buyer to define requirements  and expectations and the
separation  of service from supervision.
Source:  OECD, (1997)
DECENTRALIZATION
Thus  far,  "govemment"  or  "public"  has  been  considered  as one  unitary  entity.  In  all but  the  smallest
countries of the world, however, there are multiple levels of govemment.  Political  and fiscal decentralization  has
been an important trend in the last 30 years. The goals have been multiple, but they are primarily clustered around
ensuring more community voice and participation.  This is believed to produce better public service through more
transparency and accountability,  as well as flexibility to adjust to service needs.
In theory, the purchaser-provider  model is well suited to a decentralized  framework.  This is because local
govemments  often  are  even  less able  to  be  effective  monopoly  suppliers  of services  than  national  ones.  In
addition,  the  case  of some  services,  there  may  be  economies  in  the  provision  of care  services  beyond  the
catchment area of the local government,  implying that it is inefficient for local govemments to supply the services
directly.  Local govemments  may lack the long term financing  necessary to invest in care provision.  But local
governments  can be  effective purchasers, as  they can identify the needs of their populations,  prioritize them and
purchase  care  for  them,  assuming the local governments have an adequate  financing base,  either from  own
revenues or central government transfers.  Once  again, the key role of the financing  framework emerges.  For a
small  municipality,  getting  rid  of  the  burden  of managing  an  institution  means  that  the  municipality  can
concentrate  on its role as a good purchaser.
There can be many  obstacles to implementing  a purchaser-provider  system for  social care.  The  first is the
one alluded to above:  the lack of resources at the local level for social care purchasing.  This can occur for several
reasons.
*  local  govemments  have been given  too many  functions,  relative to their  share of total  public resources
(the overall pot of resources is too small),
*  some  local govemments  have more vulnerable  individuals than others but they have fewer resources  (the
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o  local govemments do not allocate enough funds to meet social  care needs.8
Solutions  to these problems  require  central government  intervention.  The first two can be addressed  with
increased  untargeted transfers  to local governments.  The last one requires national standards or norms to ensure
that a minimum standard  of social care services  is available nationwide.  It may also require earmarked  transfers
to some local governments.
A second  reason why decentralization  does not result in the emergence  of the purchaser provider model  is
that local  governments  are not able or allowed to optimize  their social  care purchasing  (a set of providers  and a
payment mechanism does not emerge).  There are several reasons why this can emerge.
o  Local  ownership  of facilities:  in  some  countries,  the  decentralization  actually  implemented  was  a
decentralization  of facilities,  not functions.  This means,  for examnple,  that the local  government did not
get revenues, but a large care home.  Transfers from central govermment may even by tied to the operation
of this home.  Until the local government  can  get rid of this dinosaur, (by selling or transferring it to an
NGO, closing down parts,  or closing the whole thing) the government  is in the situation of the monopoly
supplier of care and there is nothing to purchase.
o  No payment system:  a  functioning  system of payments  between  purchasers  and  providers  is necessary.
During the first  years of decentralization,  (when  many of the suppliers are still governnent owned)  this
may not be in place.
o  Skill shortages: local  governments  may  lack  the  skills  to  purchase  care  effectively  and  to  monitor
outcomes.
These  problems  can  be  mitigated  through  actions  of the  central  government  or  an association  of local
governments.  (See the box on Stockholm  for an example of local  govemments  pooling their resources  to solve
these problems).  For example,  as  a service to purchasers  and clients,  one national agency can be entrusted with
standard  setting  and  quality  monitoring.  A  national  agency  can  also  provide  methodological  support  to
gatekeepers and providers,  and support research  and training on best practice.  The national government can help
to  support an intergovernmental  payment system, with serious sanctions  for non-payers.  The restructuring of the
provider sector can be assisted by national governments  as well, through master planning processes  and one-time
subsidies to help restructure/close  institutions.
One  problem  which  can  not  be  resolved  is  when  municipalities  are  too  small  to  manage  low
probability/high  cost social risks.  This can happen for example,  when the main employer in a town shuts down,
causing extensive social stress and no public revenue.  It can also happen with very small municipalities.  In this
case,  decentralization  of the social  care responsibility  is not practical  without some  consolidation of government
units of development of a regional government structure.
In  sum,  political  and  fiscal  decentralization  can  provide  support  for  the  development  of an  improved
financing  framework.  But for  this  to happen,  partnership  and support  from  the central  government  is  usually
necessary  to  ensure  the  transformation  of the  monopoly  suppliers  to  providers  in  a properly  regulated  quasi-
market.
s  This statement obviously begs the question of "how much social care is enough and who should decide"?  This is an
important question beyond the scope of this paper.  For a discussion of that question in the OECD context see Lindert,
(1996); in a developing  country context,  see Klugman, (1997).
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How  MUCH  CARE  SHOULD  BE  FINANCED  BY  THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR,  AND  FOR WHOM?  How  SHOULD  THE
BUDGET  BE SPENT?
As we have discussed above, public  sector financing effectively combines two roles:
*  selection of care (the expert or the agent function), and
*  public subsidy to help reduce  the costs of care for families.
It is important  to remember  that the just because  the first role is needed does not mean the second  one is
needed.  If care is not very expensive,  families  could pay the cost themselves, with the public role limited to  the
agency function  and  quality monitoring.  But,  as noted  above,  care  is often expensive  for families,  (residential
care being prohibitively expensive),  so public subsidies end up being put in place to reduce the cost.
Ideally,  the  selection  of care  by  the  agent  and  the  decision  on  amount  of subsidy  should  be  separate
decisions.  The  agent  should  make  a  "technocratic"  recommendation,  based  on  the  latest  evidence  on  what
program  would  be best  for a  client's needs.  In reality,  this  is not possible.  Limited budgets,  the difficulty  of
determining  effectiveness  of services  and  the political  and  social  context  all  combine  to  mingle  the  decisions
together.  The purchaser  is making  both decisions  simultaneously.  The means to pay  for the  care always  enters
into the decision on the how much care and what type to provide.  It can not be fully independent.
The question still remains of how much  subsidy should be in place,  and to whom it should be given.  The
mere fact of a need does not justify 100%  public sector financing.  Resources,  especially public ones,  are always
limited, and  face  competing  priorities,  equally  important  to  someone's  well  being  (i.e.  education,  health  care,
roads, etc.).  Taxes cost money to collect, and the higher they are, the more evasion there is, so the higher the cost
to the economy  of collecting  taxes and providing  public  services.  Needs,  on the other hand,  are  infinite.  As a
result, the funds available to the purchaser will always be too little.  Choices among needs and interventions  are  a
daily problem in setting and implementing social policy.  Rationing is a reality.
Choosing among households.  In  considering  how  to  ration  funds,  most  economists  argue  that  public
subsidies  should not  go to  those  who could  pay  for the  care themselves  (the  targeting or  equity  approach).  A
corollary  to  this  argument  is  the  recommendation  to  require  some  contribution  to  service  cost  from  almost
everyone  (a  co-payment).  The  co-payment  is  supposed  to provide  a  signal  to  the  purchaser  about  the client's
valuation  of the  service,  and reduce  the increase  in  consumption  which  always  occurs  when  something  is  free.
This  economic  argument  calls  for:  (a)  directing  subsidies  to the  poor to  avoid wasting resources,  and (b)  some
form of user fees. 9
There  are problems  in applying this approach.  First, ability to pay is sometimes difficult to measure - how
to  compare  rural  with  urban,  and children's  needs  with adults needs?  Poverty  can be transitory,  with those  in
need  of social  care  services  in transitory poverty.  Forcing them  to pay could reduce  their  ability to  get out  of
poverty.  But once  they are  out of poverty, it is  hard to force  a direct contribution, but easy to collect taxes from
them.  Second,  some problems  are  catastrophic  in nature  - the  expenditure  is large  at  a given point  in time  (or
over  time),  so  that  having  to  pay  out of pocket  for  it  would  push  the  non-poor  into  poverty.  Examples  of
catastrophic  problems  include  a  temporarily  or  permanently  disabled  individual  in  the  family,  the  onset  of
HIV/AIDS,  etc.  From this point of view,  public subsidies are a form of insurance  in an insurance  market failure.
Everyone pays taxes and everyone  is insured.  There should be no discrimination among individuals  with  respect
to access.'°  It should be noted that this philosophy  does not solve the rationing problem - it simply adds another
dimension and may affect the size of the service package.
9  Note that the rules for requiring co-payments  should be specified in advance,  not decided ad hoc by the purchaser.
'° This  approach is referred to as the "solidarity"  principle.
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In assessing ability to pay, it is important to look at total costs of the service to the household.  Even if the
service  is  free,  there  may  be  travel  time  and  the  time  of other  household  members.  If these  costs  are  not
considered,  a 'free'  service might end up being expensive,  and therefore under-used.  For example,  once a client
has been referred  to residential  care the economic  responsibilities of his/her family and breadwinner  appears to be
taken  over  by  the  residential  institution.  Residential  care  appears  to  replace  the  family,  rather  than  being
complementary.  Non-residential  care involves  families to clients to a larger extent.  Open care requires a family;
someone  who can  take the  child to the premises where the open care is provided.  Halfway  care  facilities  could
not be operating  unless there is someone to attend to the other half;  to assist the client between his/her visits to the
halfway house.
If the care approach is exclusive  (as most residential  institutions are) most costs stay on the caregiver.  But
if we want the care to be inclusive  (to encourage  clients to get back to society and family) we will be depending
on  participation  and  contribution  from  that part of society.  Care  cannot be  inclusive  unless  there  is  someone
outside the institution to  care,  show concem  and compassion.  Usually,  these costs are not significant  and  most
families  will be  prepared  to  sacrifice  a  little  of its own  comfort and  economy to help  a  child  or a frail  elderly
parent.  In some cases it is likely that the government will have to assist the family with cash benefits to allow for
desired participation in the care process.
Finally, ability to pay and willingness to pay are different.  Some services  are too important to society (e.g.
child protection)  and they can not be left entirely up to the family's willingness  to pay even  a part of the cost.
Public  financing  is required.  In  some cases, public financing may  be combined with legal requirements  for the
household to pay part of the cost.
Choosing among services.  the essential service basket.  Some  argue  that subsidies  should be  provided
according to the type of services - which have the greatest impact on the most people  for the smallest amount of
money?  Which services  are  'basic rights'?  For example,  effective prevention  lowers the  overall  cost of social
care services,  so this type of service should be subsidized.  It is true that preventive services  are difficult to target
and  the  argument for  a public  subsidy  is  greatest  here,  since  these  services  can  be  consumed by  a  number  of
households  at the  same time with  the benefits spread across the population in terms of lower overall social  care
costs for the same result.  The problem with this approach is that separating out prevention, cure and maintenance
is complex  in social  care.  It also implies very complex value judgments  among people.  Why is the  need of a
child with  a  mild disability  greater  than that of an  elderly home-bound  person?  How much greater  is it?  Most
societies are not prepared to face these choices explicitly.
In practice,  countries  tend  to  use combinations  of the  criteria  in Table  2,  depending on  social  tradition,
degree of homogeneity,  income level,  etc.  The mix of criteria will be reflected  in the financing rules given to the
purchaser.  Current ideas  about good practice  (recognizing  the political  and social  arena in which these  choices
are made) include the following:
o  Needs mapping.  Purchasers  should  prepare  a community  needs  mapping  and  try  to  identify  those  at
highest  risk. They should consult with the community  to determine  local priorities.  Purchases should  be
partly planned  in advance.  Planning should try to define  a basic package that best suits the communities
needs and available  financing.
O  Price conscious care  planning.  Financing  should include  both low-cost  day services  and high-
cost  residential  interventions  to  avoid  the  low  cost  ones  being  rejected  by  households  with
limited means in favor of the subsidized high cost ones.  For a given problem, purchasers should
use the lower cost ones  as much as possible  and the higher-cost  ones as little as possible.  This
tends to favor day care services, which on average tend to have better outcomes.
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Table 2:  'Objective' Criteria for Allocating  Funds Among Families and Programs
Criteria  Who benefits?
Equity - finance  care for the poorest,  others  This criterion seems to be objective, until the question of how to
pay on a sliding scale.  define poverty and available resources is faced (including  resources at
the time of a catastrophe).  In practice this criterion,tends  favors
whichever group is judged to be in need (the poor, minority  groups,
women,  age groups, etc.).
Solidarity - everyone has  equal access if they  This criterion usually results in an assured basic package, but may
have need.  result in under-funding  of services to the poorest owing to a budget
constraint, while substituting for the family in some cases.
Catastrophic  cost - finance  care with a cost  This criterion favors severe  problems over smaller, more manageable
much too high for an individual family to bear  ones.  It also does not favor prevention,  which may mean that small
(the social  insurance approach).  problems grow into big ones.
Cost effectiveness- finance  care with the  This criterion also seems to be objective, but actually  favors those
biggest impact  on someone's life.  with the least severe  problems, since these are easier and the service
has a much higher chance of succeeding.  It also favors prevention.  It
should be noted that "effectiveness"  is exceedingly difficult to
measure, and is not the same as success.
Cost effectiveness  should be applied to treatments which provide
similar outcomes, but not to ration funds between treatments  with
different outcomes.
*  User  fees.  Wherever possible, seek a contribution from the household.  This contribution will both save
money and  provide  information  about the client's perception  of effectiveness.  For  example,  the elderly
will chose home care three times  a week instead of once a week if the care is free.  But if the client pays a
fee  per  visit,  then  three  times  a  week  care  will  only  be  selected  if it  is really  needed.  Equally,  co-
payments  for homecare should not be higher than for residential  care.  If they are, the family will wrongly
pressure  the  system for  residential  care.  User  fees  should  be  similar  for  substitutable  services  (those
addressing the same problem).
*  Purchasers should consider total costs to the household of service options, and include those in evaluating
household contribution.
*  Choice.  Provide choice to client,  with prices  which reflect  the opportunity cost.  Options  with a higher
cost will only be chosen when the benefits are perceived to be higher.
*  Information. Allocate  financing to monitoring  and evaluation.  This  should include  analyzing  household
costs and perceptions  of value.  It should also  include educating clients  and the community about needs,
options and choices, to reduce the information gap between the community and the purchaser.
In sum, OECD countries have more or less abandoned the idea that the public authorities  shall both finance
social  assistance  services  and  provide  (produce  and  deliver)  the  services  through  their  own  organizations.  A
change  can  be  seen  towards  a  system  by  which  public  authorities  (state,  counties,  municipalities)  take  the
responsibility  for  the  financing  and purchasing  while  the provision (production  and  delivery)  of the  services  is
entrusted  to others.  In the provision  sector,  monopolistic  public provision  of social  care  services  is unlikely  to
produce the best results for society or the client.  Some kind of
market  provision  offers  much  better  options  in  terms  of quality.  However,  even  in  areas  where  no  private
suppliers are ready to provide the services,  the public  authorities have made a division between the purchaser and
the provider's role but kept them both within the framework of the public  authority.  Development of a purchaser-
provider financing framework is critical to establishing this market, and ensuring access.
However,  the purchaser role is a complex one, subject to a number of political,  social and economic
pressures.  The purchaser  serves multiple  interests.  The rationing of funds among service products  and clients is
the result of the interplay of these interests through the institution of the purchaser.
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Information transmission  is the key to making the system work.  The easiest information to transmit is the
cost of service, which comes through the price
signals.  The  market  helps  to  transmit  information  about  production  efficiency.  However,  as  each  client  is
different  and  therefore  services  are  not  standardized,  the  information  in  a  price  signal  is  less  than  would  be
expected in another type of service industry.
More complex  are the need and outcome signals.  Demand  (what society is willing to pay with private and
public  funds)  emerges  through  a  political  and technical  process.  Services  free  to  client will  always find  more
needs  than services  that are  costly to the client.  However,  clients understand  quality, and  given an opportunity
will give the purchaser/financier  information about perceived quality and effectiveness.
Fiscal  and  political  decentralization  may  make  the  balancing  of these  interests  even  more  difficult.
However,  it  may  also  provide  the  political  opportunity  for  the  introduction  of  a purchaser/provider  model.
]Box 2: Purchlasimg amd providing social care for adolescents  annd chldren iin Stockholm city
The approach  of municipality of Stockholm (pop. 750 000) to ensuring the availability of social care services for adolescents
and children at risk provides an example of how the purchaser-provider spilt works in practice.
Until  1970 almost all care provision was in the hands of public authorities: the City of Stockholm, the County (mainly
responsible for health care) and the state.  The forms of care were private foster homes and public institutions; with foster homes
representing the larger part of care provision.  In the late 70's and beginning of 80's private entrepreneurs started to provide care
and services  for children (and also adults).  Most new care developed out of foster homes that expanded and became small
institutions and group homes.  This was the start of a market for care provision, which expanded  slowly and came to a peak 1992,
when it started to balance the demand in a rather harmonic  way. Alongside the private providers, there are still some municipal
residential  care centers  operating,  mainly with the purpose to give short-term care and/or to prepare for foster home referrals.
Stockholm is divided  into 18 districts.  The Social Assistance  Office (SAO) at each district has its own budget for social services,
allocated  according to criteria such as social and economic needs.  Each SAO is in charge of assessing needs and translating them
into demands  for service, for to purchase  care and to pay for the care costs with their budgets.  Care providers are private, and some
of them NGOs.  There are also some municipal residential  care facilities that are handled by an Administrative Agency (Stockholm
HVB) that provides care for children,  both to the City of Stockholm and to some other 20 - 30 municipalities in the region. '
For reasons of economies of scale (saving money and concentrating skills in one office), Stockholm concentrates  some of the
purchasing  functions into a central office, which  acts as a broker for the districts.  The central office (Bureau for Placement, a part
of the Social  Assistance Administration,  City of Stockholm) actually negotiates the contracts with the care providers.  To procure
the care, the Broker announce a tender and gets around 85 bids among which less than half results in contracts. There are two types
of contracts:
o  long term contracts  (1-3 years) for frequently used services (about 35 given out per year, based on demand forecasts).
These specify a price and quantity to be purchased over the year, and
o  short-term contracts, for infrequently used services, which are paid for as demand arises. The broker gives advice to the
SAO concerning placements  at these care facilities.
The only state owned institutions today are meant for compulsory care of adult drug- and alcohol abusers and delinquent youngsters.
This represents  a minor proportion of all individuals in care (350 adults and 6-700 young delinquents)  Some State or County owned
institutions provide care  for severely handicapped persons.
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Box  2 (Continued)
The long-term  contracts  help  to ensure  a stable  supply of services,  as they  lower  the provider's  risk  thus reducing  costs.
They also insure that care is available throughout the city so that clients do not have to travel too far from their families.  The short-
term  contracts provide flexibility.
The advantages  of this system are:
*  Competence and capacity is concentrated to one single agent  (broker).
*  The broker can  act  as a strong negotiator that can keep the costs on a reasonable  level.  This is helpful  for small  districts
and municipalities.
*  The  broker  has  a  good  control  over  the  supply  in  advance,  which  means  one  can  avoid  ad  hoc,  and  panic  driven
decisions in single client cases.
*  The  experiences the broker  gets  from one provider can  be used versus others.  Mistakes don't have to be repeated  too
often.
*  The  skills  in  the  broker  office  are  helpful  for both  providers  and  the purchasers;  they  can rely on  support  and  good
advice.  (Providers that are likely to provide sub standard can be kept out of care business.)
*  The stable  staffing of the broker's office  can to some  extent  compensate  for high staff tumover and lack of continuity
on district level. T he broker stays in close contact with the social worker at the district concemed.
*  The risk of an expensive long term contract is shared among districts.
*  Economy of scale achieved, lowering unit cost of care (which cannot be achieved  in a rather small  district).
The disadvantages of this system are:
*  Some districts may think that having a broker office  is "centralism"  and they try to set up own care organizations  (they
are free to do so, but few uses that opportunity)
*  Capacity  is not built  up at the district level  conceming the  care market, since this is handled by the broker,  although the
social worker on district is encouraged and expected to stay in touch  with his/her particular client during placement.
*  It  raises  the price  of care  slightly since  the fees  pay a part of the  costs  for the broker  office.  But that extra  cost is
compensated  for by the City's lower unit cost for care.  .
The system  also put  an  end to the "over  planning" that was common in  the old system.  Districts had  a tendency  to over-
estimate their needs of institutional resources  as long as others paid these places.
The pros and cons outlined above indicate that small municipalities  should preferably purchase  care on a day to day basis for
single  clients,  unless  they  can pool  their resources  and set  up a  broker to deal  with  the issue.  Still - purchasing  of care  in that
flexible way (day to  day) does not mean that a market orientated  system is out of reach.  A provider can  always  sell its services  to
more than  one municipality.  The disadvantage  is that  a small municipality  will hardly build good capacity  in  purchasing if these
purchases  are rare.  (Who would  dare to take  a by-pass  surgery at  a  small hospital  that only does  that kind of surgery  every fifth
year?)
An  evaluation  of this  system was prepared  in  1993-94.  The results  were  positive.  Overall,  unit  costs were  lower for  an
acceptable  level  of  quality.  However,  the  implementation  of  the  purchaser-provider  system  coincided  with  several  other
management  changes and budget cuts  in Stockholm city and county.  As a result, it is difficult to distinguish  between  the effects  of
2 the different measures.
2  The evaluation was conducted by The National Board of Health and Weifare  in Sweden and was published in the Report
Series Active Follow Up 93/94,  by Lead Economist Karin Mossler. The follow up study targeted the privatization  effects in
Stockholm municipality  and county administration in general.
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Table 3: Alocadon of Funmetions in Stockhollm
PuErchaser  (district)  ?Purchaseir-lBroker  (central)  Providers
o  Assesses and prioritizes  (1)  Contracting:  o  Produces the quantity and
needs,  makes a care plan,  o  Agree with (make  contracts on  quality of care at the price
and secures  client  yearly basis) with providers.  agreed.
agreement  and family  o  Agree  with (set a day price) with  o  Providers are required  to
support.  providers.  submit to audits and
o  Rations  financing.  o  Manage  the administration  and the  monitoring indicators,
o  Reviews  service.  billing.  including statistics showing
recommendation  from  costs, number of clients,
broker, accepts them or  (2) Matching (prescribing)  outcomes etc.
sends them back for further  o  Match client to best care option  o  Providers are responsible  for
work.  and give a proposal back to the  their own training,
o  Pays for care.  district.  development and all other
o  Reviews outcomes on client  measures that make them
level, provide feedback to  (3) Quality monitoring:  competitive and able to
broker.  o  Assess and monitor the quality (on  produce good quality care
o  The ultimate responsibility  aggregated  level).  and services.'
for a client always rests with  o  Present outcome, costs and
the purchaser.  propose new contracts to the
political board as well as
termiination of contracts  no longer
needed.
o  Keep informed about demand and
supply and take initiatives to
encourage provision of care that is
needed.
1 All care provision is also monitored by The County Administration Board (a regional state function) and the National
Board of Health and Welfare  (a central state function).
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PART II:  OVERVIEW  OF SOCIAL CARE PROVISION IN TIE ECA REGION
SUMMARY  OF SOCIAL CARE  SITUATION
The  legacy  from  the  Soviet  era  was  to  provide  care  for  vulnerable  citizens  in  residential  institutions.
Today, most transition countries still use this approach,  although projects  aiming at replacing residential  care - or
parts of it - with community based non-residential  alternatives are growing as well.  This overview below is based
on the experience  gathered from a number of care related projects  in the region. Anecdotal data has been collected
from  countries  in the  region  to  exemplify  the  current  structures  of care  and  services,  how  and  by whom  it  is
managed,  its costs  and  financing.  Note  must be  taken  that  the data  are not  comparable  due  to  differences  in
reporting techniques  as well  as  the time period the figures refer to.  This chapter will  focus mainly  on children's
situation.
Table 4:  Children Age  0-3 in Infant Homes,  1989 and 1998
(Per hundred thousand
0-3 population)
Country  1989  1998  1989 -1997
(percent change)
Czech Republic  533,0  571,7  3
Slovakia  191,7  44
Hungary  504,6  378,9  -25
Bulgaria  873,8  1299,6  46
Romania  836,4  56
Estonia  149,9  115
Latvia  528,2  996,5  72
Lithuania  275,6  324,1  16
Belarus  169,4  325,6  75
Moldova  183,5  285,8  31
Russia  208,3  365,0  64
Armenia  13,2  23,4  68
Azerbaijan  35,5  27,0  -20
Georgia  75,7  79,9  -25
Kazakhstan  122,4  267,3  78
Source: MONEE project databases
The deteriorating  economic  conditions  and the far reaching  economic  and political changes  in the  1990s in
ECA  caused  a  major  increase  in  poverty  and  vulnerability  in  the  region.  Between  1988  and  1998,  absolute
poverty rates increased  from 2 percent of the population to 21  percent - an unprecedented  1  0-fold increase (World
Bank,  2000).  By  1997, real  incomes  were  30-60%  of the  recorded  1990  levels.  Unemployment  and poverty,
especially among families with children, rose to levels not seen before in these countries.  The transition brought
all kinds of deprivation - from outright hunger to the disruption of previous norms and expectations  for the social
structure.  Social protection needs  increased along with poverty.  However,  most governments cut back cash and
in-kind  social  supports in the face  of major fiscal  crises (caused  in part by the downturn).  Overall, the negative
impact of the early years of the transition  on people's  lives, especially  children,  was  unprecedented.  (UNICEF,
1997; and 2000; World Bank, 2000).
Use  of residential care is growing.  One response to this poverty crisis in most countries in the region was
a major increase in the number of children in residential  care.  This trend shows no sign of abating.  Some of the
countries  place  around  1 percent  of their  children  in  infant  homes,  while most  countries  show lower  figures.
These  are  high figures  compared  to Western  Europe, both as a total number of children brought up  out of their
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families and as the number placed  in residential  care.  The figure for Sweden is 0,5 percent of all children placed
out of their families and the majority of these children are placed in foster homes.
Official  data  from  concemed  countries  confirm that  the  number of children  directed  to  care  institutions
increases every year and that only a small part of these children were placed in alternative care.  This development
continues  despite  that fact  that countries  are  instituting changes  in cash  benefit systems  to help  families  keep
disabled  children  in  their  homes  and  that  the  share  of funds  allocated  to  non-residential  care  appears  to  be
increasing.
Elderly, mentally and physically disabled  people and children  are the three big client groups.  Children are
either (a) orphans,  (b) not orphans  but nonetheless  deprived of parental  care,  or (c) children with social  problems;
e.g.  children not deprived of parental  care but at risk for other reasons due to their own behavior and/or parental
maltreatment.  Poverty plays  a role;  some of the clients now institutionalized  should not be in institutions if they
were not poor or lacked  someone  who  cared  for them.'  The commonly  used term "social  beds"  indicates  that
residential  care is used for clients who really should not be in care if  they could be provided for in other ways.
Alterinative  care is growing.  Ambitious work is going on in the region to develop community based care
(see  Box  3  below).  These  altematives  aim at helping with  housing,  and to give  counseling  and support to
families and vulnerable people. The community based care is not only less expensive than residential care but also
more  cost  effective,  of the  following  reasons.  The alternative  care  can  in  many cases  postpone  or prohibit  a
referral  to residential  care.  It helps clients to cope with their situation after release  from residential care.  It also
takes into account the client's own ability to function which has an impact on the costs for staff.
Alternative  care  forms  are mainly used  for elderly  that can  cope themselves  with the support of a home-
helper, but sometimes also for disabled.  Home-helpers  are available and fairly easily trained in many countries in
the region, but home care  has not become  as professionalized  as in Westem  countries.  Guardianship  and foster
homes  for  children are  increasing.  Figures from  Lithuania  year  2001  indicate that  altemative care  for children
covers 51  percent  of total number of children in care.  However,  there are differences between countries.  Some
have come far in appointing guardians for children among which some would have been placed in residential care
while  other  countries  report  less  non-residential  alternatives  for children  although  it  is  a  policy  goal  to  give
priority to services rendered  at home and in other forms of non-residential  care.2 The financing  forms are  partly
decisive for how this care develops.  If one form of care is subsidized or even paid by state budget, it appears to
expand.
Spenmding  onn  care.  If we  look  at the  spending  on residential  and  non-residential  care  for two  of the
countries in the ECA region, Latvia and Lithuania,  the following picture emerges.
Table 5:  Average Costs Ier Yeear amd Clent for RVesideimtalRamd  Nona-residenmtia  Care
Client  grosp  JResideneial  care  Non-residential  cave
Elderly  3700 USD  1200 USD
Disabled  4340 USD  M
Children  4880 USD (¢)  1300 USD
(*)  Data not available (few disabled placed in  non-residential  care)
Source:  Lithuania, 2000 and Latvia,  2000
'Tobis,  2000
2  Foster-home is usually meant for short-term placements  while guardianship is a long-term altemative  care form.
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Box  3: Examples  of Family-focused  Care Currently Operating in Transition Economies
*  Day centers for support,  counseling and  *  Home help and advanced home help.
service to elderly, risk families  and
disabled.  *  Support to ex prisoners to help get back
into society, find job and housing.
*  "Meals  on wheals" to give practical help
with meals delivered at the door.  *  Centers for battered woman and their
children for short-term ovemight  facilities
*  Local services to families with  disabled
children or social problems.  *  Group homes; small institutions that
provide  care and services to a certain client
*  Help to children who have experienced  group.
violence or been deprived parental  care.
a  Adoption  and foster care.
*  Crisis centers  for individuals/families  who
encounter different kind of crisis.  a  Night shelters for homeless people  for
short-term placements.
*  Guardianship for children instead of
referrals to institutions.  *  Rehabilitation  training for physically
disabled, assistance with handicap  devises
*  Half way houses and service-apartments  in  and handicap-equipment.
the interface between  a residential  care and
a self-dependent life in society.  *  Open programs and outreach activities  for
risk families.
•  Counseling centers
Unit  costs of residential  care represents  between  165 - 209 per cent of the  GDP per capita  whereas  unit
costs of non-residential  care amounts to 51 - 55 percent of GDP per capita.
The  differences  between  costs  for residential  and non-  residential  care  are  striking.  However,  one  has to
take  into account  that different  methods to calculate  the figures may over-emphasize  the  differences.  Also - the
large  number  of  guardianships  reported  distorts  the  comparison  since  guardians  have  a  low  remuneration.
However,  guardianship  must be  considered  as  community  based  care  because  it  allows  the  child  to  stay  in  a
family  and it is private.  Other sources of informnation also confirm that the costs for newly  developed  alternative
care services are lower than those for residential care.
Box 4:  The Pitfalls Of Decentralization During Economic  Decline  : Lessons  From Romania
In  1997, Romania transferred  the responsibility for child protection  to local governments,  and  in  1998,  accelerated  and  the
social sector decentralization  process by transferring resources,  responsibilities  and accountabilities  for many social and community
services  to  local  governments.  In  principle,  the  decentralization  was  designed  to  encourage  local  innovation  and  initiative,
including  the development of more community-based  social  care  services.  By 2000, local  governments  provided  over  50% of the
total government funding  for social services (a larger share in  social assistance  in  community services  and a smaller share  in other
sectors such as health.)
Unfortunately,  the reform became effective in the middle of a fiscal crisis.  Between  1996 and  1999, GDP fell  13% and local
government revenues fell even  more.  In  1998,  local revenues were 25 percent below the  1996 level, and  in  1999, 20% below.  This
revenue  crisis,  combined  with what  was  at times  an  ad hoc  distribution  of functions  and  ownership,  a  lack  of support  for  local
administrative  capacity  (which  was  weak),  and  constantly  changing  policies  on  revenue  transfers,  resulted  in  an  almost  chaotic
situation  in  social  assistance  in  1999-2000.  Local  govemments  were not able  to  cover the  costs  of the institutions the  suddenly
owned,  and in  some areas,  conditions deteriorated  sharply.  In other cases, governments  cut back on  cash  benefits,  which caused
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poor families  with children  to increase  demand  for institutional care  (as this was  all  that was available).  Fragmentation  of social
assistance policy, monitoring and oversight responsibilities across the national govemment reduced the scope for national leadership
and support during this process.  Local governments  viewed decentralization  not as an  opportunity, but as the national government
passing the pain  down the line.
In some  localities,  the reforms  had the desired  effect  of inducing  system change.  Some localities  were  able  to cope  by
working with  NGOs and outside assistance  to (a)  rationalize  and cut back on  institutional  care, and  (b) integrate the NGO sector
effectively into the service network, providing more choice.
Romania has worked to address these problems.  In  late 1999,  the national  government  intervened with  emergency  aid.  A
new  Law  on  Social  Assistance  was  draft  to  consolidate  national  functions  and  reduce  overlapping  roles  and  responsibilities,
enhancing accountabilities.  Beginning  in 2001,  local councils are required to fund residential care on a capitation basis, not an input
basis,  improving the incentives  for reform.  Romania's  experience  clearly shows  the importance  of a  strategic  approach  to  reform
from the start, as well  as the difficulty in implementing  a reform at a time of declining revenues.
Source:  World Bank, (2001);  UNICEF, (2000)
FITNANCING  FRAM[EWORK  - ROLES AND  RIESPONSIBELUTIHES
Mostly  moiopoloy  - even  after  decentraliztfiom.  Public  authorities  on  different  levels  - state,
regions/counties  or municipalities - most commonly  provide care.  The  non-govemmental  organizations (NGOs)
share  of the provision  is still  on  a  very  small  scale even  if figures  show that their  part increases  slowly. Most
NGO provision  is financed  by private  (donor)  sources.  There  is rarely  government  quality  monitoring.  Private
entrepreneurs in care provision are still unusual.
The financial implication of the monopoly system is that care provision is not being geared by client needs,
it is supply  driven.  The  fact that only  a  certain kind  of care  is available  is decisive  for  how  client needs  are
determined.  Funds are not allocated  among people  in need, but among providers.  The social  worker  (the agent)
has more loyalty to the supplier (the monopoly) than to the client and the referring authority (municipality) has no
incentives to make  adequate  need assessment to find out what best helps an individual.  And if needs assessments
are  not  being  performed  - or  are  poorly  performed -no  information  feeds  back  to  the  supplier  (institutions)
conceming what needs that should be met and how to best meet them.
The ongoing political  and  fiscal  decentralization  has  not changed  this picture  much.  Where  institutions
have  been  decentralized  the  funding  often remains  centralized.  Some altemative  care  - like  guardianship  - is
financed by the national level, while most altemative  care provision appears  to rest with the municipalities.  In a
long-term perspective  funds for altemative care have to be reallocated. If institutions are transferred to local level,
the funds should go with it.
The table below shows the most common split
of tasks and responsibilities between  state and the counties or the municipalities.  The state often funds
care and services of a more categorical  type (severely disabled, blind and other similar groups), they also
manage the care and are the owner of the facilities.  The  local governments  are in most cases  in charge
of non-residential  care, with a  few exceptions;  elderly in residential care  are often the responsibility of
local  governments  and the state  is sometimes  fimding guardianship,  making an  attempt  to cut back on
referrals of children to residential  care.
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Table 6:  Distribution of Financing Responsibilities  by Target Group
Target group  Residential  care  Funding  Alternative care  Funding
Children  Residential  Mostly the state, but  Foster homes  Mostly the municipal
institutions  sometimes on the  Guardians  budget, but for
municipality budget  Group homes  guardians,  state budget
Open activities  NGOs
Elderly  Homes for elderly  Mostly the  Home care  Mostly municipalities
municipalities but  Open activities  NGOs
also the state
Disabled  Residential  State mostly  Open activities  Mostly municipalities
institutions  NGOs
Input budgeting.  The provider  is usually financed by an input budget  in such a way that the provider gets
paid regardless  of what is  produced;  e.g.  the financing  is not clearly  related to the number of clients in care and
length of time in care, let alone,  the outcomes  of care.  The assumed  costs for a projected  number of clients are
allocated on beforehand.  Outcomes are not tracked  and systematically  analyzed which means that prices related
to the outcome of care  are unusual.  The authority responsible for care and services is in most cases the owner of
the care facility.
Funds  are  either  allocated:  (a)  directly  from  the  state  treasury,  (b)  through  an  agency,  or  (c)  from  local
resources,  including  central government equalization transfers, or  (d) some combination of these.  In some  cases
municipalities belonging to a
region  contribute to the funding according to their size and demand for service facilities.
Weak or non-existent  purchaser.  There is no clear distinction made between purchasers and providers in
the system.  The pure form with one clearly identified purchaser who:  (a) does  the need assessment,  (b)  acts as a
gate  keeper,  (c)  refers  clients  to  care,  and  (d)  pays  the  fees  on  the one  hand,  and  one  equally  clearly  defined
provider that (a)  manages the care, and  (b) gets paid by the fees,  on the other,  is not too common in the region.
The  following  combinations  of ownership,  management,  financing  and  power to  decide  about referrals  can be
seen (Table 7).
Since  many  institutions  assume  conflicting  roles:  ownership,  management  and provision,  financing,  and
also referrals  of clients,  they have a  strong  influence  over what clients  to  take in and discharge.  This does not
give incentives to produce good outcomes  and to be cost-effective.
Throughout  the  region  there  are  indeed  purchaser  - provider  systems  implemented,  but  they  appear  to
either lack the two essential  features that make them work adequately:  (i) right to decide and (ii) obligation to pay;
or they have more roles than they  should.  If the purchaser  who makes  the decision  to refer a  client to care does
not finance the care they cannot  ensure  that need,  as determined  by the  gatekeeper,  is financed up to the  budget
constraint so that care is rationed properly.
Little  outcome  monitoring.  There  is  no  systematic  tracking  of  outcomes  of  care  and  rather  poor
consciousness  concerning  the relationship  between  costs  and outcomes.  The absence  of appropriate  monitoring
pushes economic  considerations  (who pays)  in the  foreground  and makes these considerations  more  decisive  for
the choice of care than client's needs are.  This also makes the follow up on results unimportant.  If the purchaser
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does not strive to find  the care that can best meet client needs,  why bother to find out if these needs have been
met?  And  if this  important  element  of evaluating  outcomes  of care  is  not in  place,  the  development  of best
practice  is hampered.  There  is little feedback  to  the institutions  about  what care  is effective  and without  that
information, it is difficult for the institutions to change and adapt to clients needs and develop best practice.
Table 7: Combiinations of Elnstntuntonal  Roles  An ECA
Owiner  Manager  EInnancier  Referring  CombAlnatiouns
cHeimts
1.  Usually a state or municipality owned
institution that decides  which  clients to serve.
X  X  X  X  This type is predominating  in the region.
2. A municipality that purchases  care from a
provider (state or other), mnakes decisions to
X  X  refer clients, and pay the  fees. This is a clear
purchaser  but rather unusual in the region.
3. A provider that owns and manages  an
institution and sell its services  and is financed by
x  X  the fees. This is a provider,  also rare in the
region.
4. A municipality  that refers clients to care that
is paid by others, in most cases the state (or a
X  region). This form is common.
IPrioritization.  We have  little information  about how prioritization  is made.  We can see - for example  -
that  state financing of guardians  has supported  an expansion  of this form of altemative  care.  But we  lack full
infonnation  about the day-to-day prioritization  to ensure that the most needy  are targeted and that care giving the
best  outcomes  to  the most  reasonable  price  is used.  In  general,  two  factors  seem to  be important  for  setting
priorities,  one  is the  supply;  if there  is a place  vacant,  a client  is likely to be  referred to it.  The second is the
financing.  Care that the referring authority does not have to pay for appears to be prioritized.  Anecdotal evidence
in Moldova and Arrnenia - to take two examples - clearly show that people that are poor, end up in institutional
care. Where the resources are, children  will go.
Financial  statistics.  Financial  statistics  generally  do  not  show  the  true  costs  of care  (alternative  or
residential)  since capital and maintenance  costs sometimes are financed separately.  These costs - that are easy to
forecast  and put into the regular budget - are often covered  by the funding  authority  in a separate  budget.  The
decentralization  has resulted in multiple pipe  financing - usually  all financing  for state institutions  comes from
state  budget and  all  costs  for  municipal  institutions  are  covered  by municipal  funds.  Money  is not  fungible
between the two sources.
The part of the care  costs that are paid by the client  is usually  a relatively  small portion of the full costs.
Most alternative care is provided free.  For residential  care, in most cases a pensioner pays from
his/her pension to the care  facility and  the sum varies  from almost the whole pension  except a small sum that is
kept  as  pocket  money,  to  smaller  amounts.  In  the  perspective  of the  total  costs  for  residential  care,  the
contribution of the clients is insignificant.  But the fact that some services are free of charge for the client is likely
to increase  the demand.
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CONCLUSIONS
Confronted  with  a  massive  increase  in  poverty  and  social  dislocation,  countries  increased  the  use
institutional  care.  This has been an  unfortunate waste of resources.  It was fully understandable,  however,  as the
current system  for care and service delivery is not able to promote  a variety of alternative care  options and reach
the targets set  forth; e.g.  the concepts  for a good  financial  framework  outlined  in part I are  not possible to fully
apply.  The balance between:  (i) the needs of vulnerable people,  (ii) what the gatekeeper social  assistance  office)
finds  most  helpful  for  the client within the current budget constraint,  and (iii)  a supply of care  at good quality
and in appropriate quantity,  is difficult to realize in the current system.
Box 5: WHY  IS THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN  IN CARE GROWING IN LATVIA?
Latvia overall has experienced  a 72 percent increase in residential  care  1989-1999.  However, the distribution  has not
been  even  nationwide.  This  is  not  surprising,  as  Latvia  is  a  fiscally  very  decentralized  country,  and  since  1995,  the
responsibility  (ownership  and  operation)  for  most care  facilities rests  with  local govemments  - in some  cases  with  regional
govemments,  and  in some cases  with municipalities.  The  Government's  intent  was  that homes  would  be transferred  to  the
municipalities  from the regions which should have encouraged a market to develop.  This did not always take place  however.
It should  be noted  that not all municipalities  own  a home even when the regions did give  up control,  as Latvia ahs over 400
municipalities.  Municipalities  are  supposed  to  pay  an  output-based  fee  when  they  place  a  new  client  in  another  local
govemment's facility ( the mutual payment system).  This payment system has been slow to develop.
In 2001,  the  Ministry of Social  Welfare  in  Latvia  commissioned  a  study  on  why  in  some areas,  residential  care  is
growing faster while others are meeting new needs with community  care.  The results were  striking.
*  Municipalities  which have an institution tend to keep the institution  full, in part  in order to maintain employment.
The rate of institutionalization is growing in these regions.
*  Municipalities  which  do  not have  an  institution  have  adopted  one of two  strategies.  Some  are  building  new
institutions; others are developing more community  care.
*  In regions where the mutual payment system works well, community care grows faster.
*  All  localities cited  lack of funds as the main  constraint to the development  of more  community  care.  However,
many see community  care as an  addition to the service basket, not a substitution
Latvia's  experience  demonstrates  the  difficulty  of  achieving  results  through  a  simple  fiscal  decentralization.  A
broader strategy is necessary,  including a nationwide strategy  for facilities consolidation  and training program to develop the
purchaser and gatekeeping functions.  Improvements  in standards are also necessary.  Latvia's current strategy involves all of
these activities.
(Source:  Latvia,  2000)
Care  and  service  provision  is  driven  by  supply,  needs  are  not  properly  assessed  and  there  are  weak
incentives to focus client needs.  Costs - or rather who pays - appears to have too much impact on choices  of care
than it should and awareness  that needs  must be converted to demands, rationed and prioritized is low. Incentives
to use altemative  care are not good enough,  many municipalities prefer to use the residential care available  at  no
or little cost to their budget in order to save municipal funds for other needs.  The purchasers  do not generally pay
fees, thus lacking one of the more important functions of an efficient purchaser.  However,  if financial  incentives
are put in place - as for guardians - it appears to change  referral pattem for the better. Countries  are caught  in a
vicious circle  - the more money that goes in to residential care,  the more the fiscal burden and the more difficult it
is to find other - less expensive  and more qualitative  - solutions to peoples needs.  The input budget  system does
not encourage  competition,  it limits the care mix and give few choices  for client and purchaser, thus hampering
the improvement of effective supply of care.
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AP'AT  liMTE  HEPLIEIENT]1NG  A l  ETTIER FlA¶lEWORl
Improvement  in  social  care  services  - and  ultimately  in  the  life  choices,  opportunities,  and  welfare  of
vulnerable  groups, requires changes  in the financing framework  as part of an overall reform.  Such a change does
not mean a  shift  from  public  financing  for vulnerable  groups into private  financing,  e.g. putting  the burden  of
costs  on  the  vulnerable  families  instead  of on public  authorities.  The  public's  responsibility  for vulnerable
citizens should remain but it should take place within a better financing  framework.
This section reviews the main aspects of the current system, which need to be changed.  Several key issues
need to be addressed.  First,  the purchasers  need to be set up, with clear responsibility  and incentives to serve the
client, not the provider.  Second, budgeting and financing procedures need to be changed to allow out-put oriented
financing of providers.  Third the tools for the agreement between
the purchaser  and the provider need to be developed, including contracts, rules on pricing, and tendering.  Fourth,
existing providers need to be reforned, and new entrances  facilitated.
SETTING UP THE PURCHASER
The  table below shows - very simplified - the tasks for the purchases currently  in place  in the region,  and
the  desired mix  of functions  that  a purchaser  ideally  should  have  to  be effective.  A  purchasing  organization
should be set up with the task to assess people's needs and to find the appropriate care and service for them.  This
organization should also manage the budget for the care it purchases.  One cannot purchase unless one know what
to buy, and what are the prices. Therefore the purchaser organization  must be informed about the care market and
the costs,  in order to match client needs with the best care option available, residential or altemative care.
Cunrrent system  Piroposed systemn
Purch2ser  D  Meet with client and assess needs  D  Meet with the client and assess needs
D  Match needs with supply  0  Transfer needs into demands
o  Refer client to best available  care  '  Ration care
Suggest areas where new supply is  D  Work out a care plan with clear targets
needed  0  Refer client to best possible care
D  Pay for the care (fees)
D  Follow up on outcomes
Provider  a  Take in client  0  Take in client and work according to
D  Work according to concept for  care plan
supplier  s  Report back  to purchaser
o  Get financed on input budget  2  Finance the care establishment on
incorning fees
The purchaser's decisions to refer a client to care should be driven by a profound understanding of two
things: what a client need and how these needs can best be met.
Establishing  the  needs  is  done  in  a need  assessment  procedure  in  which  the  social  worker,  the  client
himself, his family or/and other significant individuals participate.
Needs  are not  the  same as  demands  and  assessment of needs is  a  professional  procedure  of converting
client needs  into  appropriate  and  affordable  interventions.  (The  drug addict  may express  a need  for drugs, but
what the public  sector is willing to finance is something quite different - a treatment  to get off drugs.)  The need
assessment should result in a care plan identifying  the client's weaknesses but also his/her capacity  to contribute
to  a  good outcome of the care. The purpose with care is not to "over-treat", just help with what the client cannot
manage him/herself.
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In  pursuing the best option  for meeting  the client's needs,  the purchaser  should aim at  a solution without
moving the client out of his/her  family and natural  environment;  e.g. it is better to support a family to care for its
child, to help  family members to keep an  frail elderly parent at home, to provide home-help etc.  Referrals  to care
- residential or alternative - should always be the last option.
One function of a good purchaser is to do the gate keeping to ensure that the client is referred to care only if
he/she needs it, that the right form of care is used and that there is a plan for the  care and clear targets  for what to
achieve and -not at least - how the client (in many cases)  can be brought back to society one day.  The gatekeeper
must have the power to make the (right) need-driven decisions about care and - above  all - have the money to pay
for care purchased.
REFORMING BUDGETS
The current input based budget system is a legacy from the command economy and it does not promote the
behavior and performance  we like to encourage  among care providers.  Input budgets  do not sufficiently focus on
results of care.  The new financing  system has two basic  elements:  (a)  the one who refer  a client to care should
pay  the (publicly-financed)  fees  for this  care,  -- the  single  pipe -- and  (b)  the  fee  should be  related  to  what  is
produced,  to the outputs.  If all costs for care  and services are related to its value,  to what is being produced,  we
call that an output-based payment  system.  This system gives  the purchaser  an incentive  to buy best care at best
price.  The simplest form of output-based  budgeting is a capitation  system, where the same payment is made  per
client.  More complex forms include fee for services,  according to standardized diagnoses  or outcomes.
New budgeting procedures may also include a guideline  on the amount which should be spent for a certain
type  of client,  to  avoid  cost  runaway  (see  contracting,  below).  These  guidelines  will  assist  purchasers  in
designing affordable care plans, and clarify expectations from the client side on what services are available.
Output-based budgets may imply that some revenues  have to be taken away from one  level of government
and  given  to  another  (the  purchasing  level).  If governments  stop paying  for  care  and  municipalities  take  over
financing responsibilities  governments  have to hand over funds to municipalities.  This may have to happen over
time (see part IV).  There are good models for how the  shift of budgets can be done that safeguard  an organized
retreat from residential care at the same time as funds are being freed for development  of community based care.
MAKING A MARKETPLACE:  PRICES, TENDERING,  CONTRACTING
Purchasing  and  budget  reforms  need  to be  complemented  by  the  development  of tools  to  regulate  the
purchaser-provider  financial  relationship.  The  first  tool  is  an  agreement  on  the  costs  for  care  supply.  An
economically  sound  institution  should  have  all  costs  covered  by  the  revenues  it  gets  from  its
provision  (producing  and  selling)  of care  and  services.  That  includes  not only  recurrent  costs but also  capital
costs.  A  part  of the  revenues  should  be  set aside  for  future  costs  for  maintenance,  purchases  of equipment,
vehicles etc.  If not, the institution will not be sustained.
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Current system  lFiroposed  system
Financing  n  Public authorities usually finance care  a  The public authority (purchaser) that refers a
at the institutions  they run from their  client to care (municipality)  is responsible
own budgets  for the fimancing or some or all of the costs
a  Most fnancing is according to an input  a  The budget system is based on what a
based budget system  provider produces,  e.g. per outputs, per
capita, per bed and day etc.  Global ceilings
are set to avoid over-runs and guide rationing
decisions.
A  market system, and the purchaser - provider system means that prices for care and service provision are
not set on beforehand.  As we will  discuss below,  bidding for services and making contracts with providers will
result  in a price structure that is affordable  for the purchaser  to pay and enough  for the provider to survive.  Still,
any purchaser  must  have  an  idea  about  what  is  a  fair price  on  a  care  product  and  project  the  costs  for the
purchases needed.
Cunrrent system  In  Proposed system
Prices  :  (Implicit) prices set on input  0  Explicit prices reflecting true costs
norms but not to cover all costs  n  Transparency and accountability
Revenues added over time from
different sources
El  Real costs unclear
Tender and  a  Providers assigned through  o  A care assignment is regulated by a contract
contracting  various budget systems  between purchaser and provider
o  No clear contracts  exists  C  Contracts regulate what should be achieved
o3  New providers are being  and to what costs
discriminated  and are not  0  Call for tenders allow new providers to
encouraged to be a part of care  participate in care and service production.
provision
Market  0  No real mnarket exists  0  A marked set up on which resourceful
professionals, public, NGOs and private,
compete to deliver best possible care to
lowest possible costs.
A tender procedure (when  a purchaser  identifies and mobilizes new providers) usually  does not set out the
price  on  beforehand.  A  purchasing  organization  issues  a call  for  bids  in a document  specifying  type  of care,
quality requirements,  and quantity but not price.  The tender document also discusses how contract will be made
(over what period, etc.)  The winning bid is the one that offers the best quality to the most reasonable price.
Contracts between a purchasers and providers are basically of two types.  The first is a contract concerning
just one individual  client.  This contract should regulate what results the care period is expected to give, the fees
and what they include, conditions  for payment,  time in care,  division of responsibilities  between the open  social
assistance  office  and the care  giver (issues  like contacts with  family, after  care activities,  follow  up etc.)  and a
number of similar items.  The goals for the client's care  or service should be based on the care plan. The second
type of contract is more appropriate for a purchaser that needs to purchase large amounts of care of the same kind.
In such a case the purchaser can agree with a provider to use a fixed number of places for a fixed period or time (a
year or more)  and agree on a fee.  The contract should include roughly the same items as the individual contract,
but need to be more  general.  To make contracts for too long periods of time is not advisable; there is a risk that
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the provider goes back to "business as usual" if he is not repeatedly submitted to competition.  It could be helpful
for the purchaser if a national  agency or ministry  (or the project work group) could work out a standard  contract
as guidance (see Bilson and G6testam,  2002).
LICENSING
Licensing  sets  the  ground  rules  for who  can  participate  in  the  tender.  Once  standards  are put  in  place
concemed parties (purchaser,  providers, clients, relatives,  social workers etc.) would have a fairly good idea about
what  to  expect  from  a  certain  caregiver/provider.  Standards  for  similar  care  facilities  should  be  the  same
regardless of who runs the places,  public authorities,  NGOs or private providers.  Minimum standards express the
lowest threshold;  standards  of excellence  raises the standards  above  this minimum  level.  Doing that,  of course
gives provider  competitive advantages.  This is an important element in the market structure.  Standards are also a
good  guidance  for  how  to  train  staff  and  management  and  they  set  the  rules  for  the  monitoring.
Current system  Proposed system
Licensing  Rules and regulation set the  *  Providers - regardless if they are
condition for care provision but  public, NGO or privately rnanaged -
the few private and NGO  can be licensed if they meet the
providers are usually not  standards.
covered by the rules.  *  Providers are monitored and
corrected if they deviate from
applying standards
*  Licenses can be withdrawn
Most countries in Western Europe  have different types of licensing  system in place  to safeguard qualitative
care  provision  and  to  ensure  that  sub  standard  care  is  avoided.  Basically,  a  provider  that  is able  to  meet  the
demands in the standards,  could be licensed.  Licenses can either be issued by a public  authority or by a licensing
agency  that works  on behalf of such public body.  Issuing a license  will  always include  an obligation  to  cancel
the license if a caregiver no longer measures up to the license requirements.
REFORMING THE PROVIDERS
If countries adapt the principle of setting up contracts (individual  or group) between the purchaser  and provider, it
should  include  the current  residential  institutions,  or rather,  those that  will remain  and continue  to provide  care
and  services.  This change  raises  a number  of issues.  One  is  the legal  status  of a public  institution.  It may be
difficult  for a public  institution  that has had  its  revenue  from  an input based  govemment budget  to  find itself
submitted  to  competition  on  a  care  market  and  face  the  risk  of losing  its revenues  due  to  poor  performance,
although this has been tried.  It is critical for success that all institutions are in the market and face competition.  If
some kind of guarantee is given to the public institutions, that would immediately conflict with the very  core in a
competitive  market  since private providers  will not get the  guarantees.  This issue will have to be faced clearly.
One  option  is  to  have  competition  among  public  institutions  first,  to  facilitate  a  consolidation  and  get  the
institutions and their owners used to the system.
Current system  Proposed system
Provision of  *  Public sector provides  care and services  *  Some categorical residential  care
residential care  for disabled, elderly, orphans and  remains  within the public sector but
children deprived of parental care.  the provision of care and services is
opened up for other providers, private
and NGOs.
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Provision of  Public authorities (mostly  D  Public authorities  continue to provide
alternative care  municipalities)  are in charge of  alternative care, expand it and open
community-based  care and some NGOs  up for more provision from NGOs
and private providers  are entering the  and private entrepreneurs.
provision.  State active in guardian  and
some foster home care.
A market for care  and service provision  will  not occur by itself,  it has to be  stimulated  and  supported  at
start and barriers to change  has to be removed.  In Westem countries market provision has  emerged  in different
ways.  For example,  (a)  some  home helpers working well together take over a part of a  service in a community,
change  status from  public entity to private firm and begin  selling their services  to their  former  employer,  (b)  a
foster home expands its activities,  takes in more  children and become a  small  group-home  for children,  (c)  some
well trained social  workers set up a family counseling unit, selling services to the municipality or to family courts,
(d)  a day  nursery  becomes  privatized  and  is taken  over by  its staff.  These  are merely  a  few  examples  on the
transition  from public to private provision.  The newly started private providers  usually offer their services to the
public authority concemed and a  formal agreement - a contract - is set up. But it can also be a top down exercise
in which top management decide to privatize  some public units.
There will be a need to support the private and NGO sector to take on the challenge to develop  community
based care.  Experiences  from other countries  in the region also speak for the necessity to support the community
based care provision from the governmental level, once knowing what type of care to support.  A plan for this has
to be developed,  including  (i) mapping of provision of  all care,  (ii) assessing the need of care,  (iii) projection of
future  demand of care, (iv)  and working out an idea about a future  service/care basket.  Doing such plan would
give  a government (county, big municipality)  a fairly good understanding  of a future service mix, which - in turn
- is a  condition  for the decision  about what care  and  services to keep operative  and what new care and services
that are needed.
Standards  (and  to  some  extent  also  gate  keeping)  will  have  an  impact  on  how  a  government  (or  a
county/municipality)  shapes the  care  and  service  structure.  A basic  element  in any  standard  is to  tell what  an
institution is meant  for, what it shall do, in what way it can be helpful for clients  and what type of clients that fit
in.  Having  these  two  elements  in  place  - (i)  an  idea  about  the  new  service  mix  (from  the  purchasing  and
budgeting reforms),  and (ii)  standards  for quality in the service  mix, will help  a government to  focus  support to
the new providers  on the essentials.  Or to put it the other way around - a government that does not know what it
needs, how much and of what quality, will not be of any help to a growing market of providers; it would not know
what new initiatives to promote  and support.  Neither would it know what are the obstacles  for private and NGO
provision.
How a service is valued has an impact  on supply and demand.  With growing consciousness  about quality
and outcomes, purchasers will demand  services that produce a good outcome and meets the targets set out in care
plans and referral  agreements  (contracts)  between purchaser  and  provider.  At the same  time the institution that
fails  to deliver what has  been agreed,  will  lose confidence and become  less attractive  on the  care market.  The
demand for these services will decrease.  This produces a good incentive  for the provider to perform well, which -
in turn - benefits the clients, the economy and the development of quality in care provision.  '
Finally,  it is  important  to repeat  that  a  market  for care  and  services must protect  itself from low quality
provision that may even be harmful  for clients.  Concerns have been raised that competition on lowest price will
harm quality of care.  But this problem - if it occurs - can be remedied.  First, the licensing, standards  for care,
' There are data sustaining the conclusion that institutions that are highly specialized have less possibilities to be cornpetitive
and survive  on a privatized care market compared to multi-purpose centers that are flexible and can adapt to changes in
demand
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and  monitoring  will  safeguard  good  enough  quality.  Only  licensed  safe  providers  should  participate  in  the
competition.  Second,  we have to assume  that managers and staff have  good ambitions  - there  is no reason  why
this should  change as a result of the transition from one system to another.  Third, a purchaser  is not likely to buy
poor products since low quality care does not give sustainable results, but rather results in recurrent needs of care,
which  in turn, is cost increasing. A  competent purchaser will do the right choice from the first time
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TPARlT  V'.  1HODW  TO IEANDLJE  T1'31E  TFRANSHITH]ON
Making  the  transition  to  a new  financing  system  will  be  demanding  for  all  stakeholders.  A number  of
transition problems  emerge.  Countries  seeking to change the  financing structure  to a purchaser-provider  model
need to develop a sound project plan.  The plan needs to be based on:
o  an analysis of the current situation, which maps out what the economic roles are in the current system,  the
costs and who pays those costs;
o  a proposed  institutional  structure for new system,  specifying new roles, responsibilities,  accountabilities
and financial  flows, and an analysis of the incentives;
o  a needs assessment, projecting  possible future demand  scenarios with a change in practices towards more
community and family centered care;
o  a costing of the demand  scenarios;
o  a proposed new financial flow structure  given (b) and (d);
o  a facilities management plan; and
o  and activity plan for project implementation.
In this  section,  we  discuss  the  concepts  involved in preparing  such a  project.  Tools to help prepare  this
analysis are available on http://eurochild.gla.ac.uk/chanain  .
Changing  the financial  rules of the game is no.t enough  to ensure better use of public and private resources
toward  better  outcomes.  Much  more  is  needed.  For  example,  all  the  work  of setting  up  a  purchaser  and
developing  contracts will pay few dividends  if reforms are not made in gate keeping,  including  developing better
assessment  and  care  planning  tools.  Likewise,  contracts  with providers  should  make  reference  to  standards,
which must be observed by contractors.  Training programs are needed to ensure  that staff really can deliver  the
quality promised  in the  standard.  A monitoring  system needs to be in place  to protect clients.  These issues  are
not dealt with in this section, but should be part of the overall reform strategy2.
Social  care  reform  strategies  are  often  undertaken  in  the  context  of  the  need  for  public  expenditure
reduction.  However,  as noted above, the type of reform program  discussed here is not likely to be expenditure
reducing,  both  because  new  investments  will  be  needed  to  develop  new  services  and because  the  increased
availability of community-based  services will reveal unmet needs, increasing  demand for those services.  Indeed,
an atmosphere  of fiscal  crisis  is  probably  counterproductive  for this  type  of reform.  It is  difficult  to  reach
agreement among stakeholder on new roles and responsibilities as budgets are being sliced.  It is better to develop
the reform  plan  in line with  available  financing.  Public  demand  for social  care rises with  national income  (all
other variables  constant)  so  it is reasonable  to  expect that as income  rises,  social  care will absorb  a constant  or
growing share of expenditures.  Reform is, therefore,  imnportant,  as it makes  it possible  to serve more clients with
better quality care and reduce  the harm done by residential  care.
ANALYZING THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A reform plan starts with an analysis of current expenditures and assets.  This includes:  total expenditures,
unit costs,  and a  sources  and uses of funds  matrix.  As noted above,  all costs  need to be  considered,  including
2  See Harwin and Bilson, 2002; Bilson and Gotestam, 2002; and UNICEF 2000 and 2001 for discussion of comprehensive
reforrn issues.
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opportunity  costs  of capital.  The  reform  team needs  to  work  with  the  current  providers  to  prepare  this  data.
Worksheets  can be developed to collect  the data,  which is then aggregated across the country (or across regions).
A  rough  assessment  of  the  balance  sheet  (valuation)  for  each  provider  can  also  be  developed.
Table 8:  Measuring Total Costs - An Example
A.  Recurrent municipal costs peryear  Costs  residential care  Costs  non-residential care
Wages excluding Tax
Tax
Office - administration, other consumable  materials
Premises
Maintenance  of premises
Utilities (electricity,  heating)





B.  Capital costs  Costs residential care  Costs  non-residential care
Building
Office hardware  and audio equipment
Furniture
Special equipment  (medical, training etc.)
Kitchen equipment
Cars
Interests (breakdown on x years)
Other capital costs
Total
C. Indirect costs  Costs residential care  Costs  non-residential care
Social Assistance Office's  (SAO) for need
assessment,  care planning and referral of clients.
SOA costs for having contact with client during
c  a  re__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
SOA costs  for follow up on client outcome
SAO costs  for preparing and maintaining after care
arrangements
SAO costs for keeping contact with family during
placement of client
Opportunity  costs (clients  go back to work,  support
family and pay taxes)
The  reform team  also needs  an  assessment  of utilization  by target  group  based  on the  demographics  of
clients, rates of treatmnent by demographics and geography,  etc.  For example,  what percent of children in each age
group are clients?  Of what type of service?  With what diagnosis (reason  for entering  the system)?  It is useful to
analyze  this  by region,  by  income  group,  and  by  ethnic  group  or  any  other  important  determinant  of socio-
economic status.
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DEVELOP THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
The next step is to map out the current and new institutional  structure,  using the  functions map in part M
above.  It  is  easiest to  start  with  the  purchaser.  Which  functions of the purchaser  are  currently  being  done?
Which  ones  are  missing?  Given  current  and  proposed  political  and  fiscal  decentralization,  what  level  of
govemment  could have  this responsibility?  It may be  useful to develop  options,  and consider for each  option,
how radical  a  change  from  current practice  this  would imply.  It is  also important  to  consider the  number of
clients to  be served in each purchasing unit, based initially  on the above  analysis of rates of utilization,  and the
number of transactions  with different  levels of government  a change would  involve.  Too many transactions can
be expensive.  In the case of too many small municipalities, one proposal could be to force them to work together
as  in the  Stockholm  model.  Finally,  what  functions  are best performed  nationally?  For  example,  should  the
national  govemment make up a model contract?  These issues need to be considered  as well.
This analysis  should also consider  the current  ownership  of the provider  structure.  If the  intention  is to
close or consolidate facilities, are the owners prepared to undertake  such a change?  If the owners are small  local
govenmments,  such a  change  may not be possible.  This  would  imply  a  further step  in the reform  - transferring
ownership.
NEEDS ASSESSMENT,  COSTING AND PROJECTION OF FINANCIAL  FLOWS
One of the  first questions the  Ministry of Finance  asks  about any reform  is - what  will it cost?  As the
purpose of the financing reform is to shift clients and money toward more higher value uses (community  care,  for
example),  projection of future costs should not be based on current utilization patterns, but new ones.  This is not
easy to do, as it will depend in part on how quickly  the provider sector can respond.  One approach is to make a
simple projection of the number of people  in each key risk group in ten years.  Then, using utilization coefficients
for a country, which does not have  a tradition of institutional  care,  a project  utilization pattern  can be developed.
Looking at  this  pattern,  what  kind  of facilities  change  does  this  involve?  Is  such a  change  possible?  Some
adjustment of the projections may need to take place, based on the distance between the current utilization  and the
desired utilization to reflect an appropriate  speed of adjustment.  A trend then needs to be projected  between the
current utilization and the future utilization to get annual demand estimates.
Using  existing  unit costs  (based on full  capital  cost),  and  the  above  demand  forecast,  an annual  budget
projection  for  this  new  pattern  could  be  formulated.  This  initial  assessment  will  not  include  the  costs  of
restructuring, however.  These will need to be calculated  later.  As a result, the cost estimate  at this stage  will be
an under-estimate  of likely costs.
The final step in the projection of costs is to map the annual budget forecasts into financial flows from the
purchasers to the provider, by type of facility and ownership.  This will show the winners and losers.  It will give
some idea of what are the resource re-allocation needs in order for the purchasers to have the funds to purchase.  It
may also show which facilities will be in deficit, providing a basis for the next stage of the operation.
FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT  AND MANAGEMENT  PLAN
The next step is to use the projections  above to develop a facilities master plan.  It is not necessary  to map
out all the new community-based  options which should  be developed.  Many of these  will be developed  in the
community, based  on the community needs.  Often the facilities will be multi-purpose centers,  serving more than
one type of client.  For example,  family counseling  and open  family programs can be  combined with foster care
and guardian  support, and needs assessment.  NGOs may be contracted to develop the services within the center.
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The main purpose the master  plan is to target  existing residentialfacilities  for bed reduction or closure.  It
is  critical  that  a  plan  be  developed  and  agreed  to  restructure  institutions  at  an  early  stage  in  the  project.
Unoccupied  beds  have  to  be  paid  by  someone.  As  purchasers  start  buying  less  residential  care  beds,  the
institution will have to charge more for the full beds to cover costs.  This will push up costs  in the system overall.
The  facility  master plan  should  be  discussed  with  the  owners  and managers  of the  facility.  All  stakeholders
should agree  with the plan.  Implementation  of the plan  should include  staff and management  training, and a plan
for handling redundant staff.  It is most likely that the plan will show the need of cutting back on residential care
and developing new community based care.
When Western Europe countries implemented the purchaser - provider system in mid 90's, some managers
submitted their own public entities  (care  facilities)  to competition  as a technique to distinguish the best from the
ones  producing  sub  standard.  Letting  public  entities  compete  is  one way  to  do  the cut  back  and  the process
showed that many  public  entities were over budgeted. Another way is to assess the entities to see which of them
that provide good quality to best price, and simply close down the other,  or restructure them.
DEVELOP A PROJECT PLAN
With all  these analyses in hand,  the project team is ready to  develop a project plan.  Key elements of the
plan should include:
I.  Preparation of the legislative framework for the new financing  framework:
*  new rules on fiscal transfers to ensure adequate funding  goes to the purchasers, and that funding can go
to providers on an outcome basis
*  remove obstacles  for NGO and private providers
*  permit pilots and experiments
*  enshrining  the  new  roles  and  accountabilities  into  legislation,  including  the  power  of the  central
authority to monitor all providers
2.  Training plans are  needed around  the new functions and accountabilities  for all public  officials,  as well as
for NGO and potential  private providers (especially  important at an  early stage for purchasers/gatekeepers).
For example:
*  Everyone needs training in standards  and licensing procedures.
*  Purchasers need training in care planning, using new tools.
*  Purchasers  and financial  authorities need training in output budgeting and contracting.
*  Support needs to be given to providers.
*  On demand support is also helpful.
3.  Develop  adequate  financial  management  system  in purchasers  and providers.  This  is probably  a separate
project.  Providers  and  purchasers  can  be  required  to  buy  a  national  system  (but  financing  for  this
investment will be needed).
4.  Develop model contract for purchasers, test it.
5.  Consider how to assist community care providers to develop new services  (investment financing,  training,
etc.).  Consult with NGOs, as they could provide  some support and financing.
6.  Make sequenced activity plan, including  plan for piloting purchasing arrangements  (either de facto or real).
Indicators of success need to be specified.
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7.  A key  subproject  will be  the implementation  of the facilities  management  plan.  Funding for this will be
required in advance.
CONCLUDNG NOTE
This paper has reviewed the concept of a financing framework  for social  care - its function  in a pluralistic,
decentralized  political  system  and  a  market  economy.  We  have  discussed  the  approaches  used  by  OECD
countries  to modify  institutional  roles in  order to improve  incentives  for quality,  client  service,  and  efficiency.
Unsatisfied  with  a purely  public  system,  yet  aware  of inherent  failures  of unfunded  and unregulated  private
system,  OECD  countries  have  adopted  forms  of the  purchaser-provider  system  pioneered  in  health.  This
approach  has been judged to be successful.  Two country  case studies discussed how systems work in practice  in
Westem Europe.
Despite widespread recognition of harmful  nature of public residential care for children,  use of this service
continues to grow in ECA.  The legacy of past use of this service model explains part of the trend, but the lack of
financing reforms is a contributing  factor,  as in most countries, all fiscal incentives  at the local level point to using
institutions  when  children  are  in need  instead of shoring up families.  Countries  such as  Romania have been
courageously  trying  to implement reforms  in the financing  system,  However,  these  efforts have  at times been
hampered  by  a lack  of an overall  strategy,  causing  even more  stresses in  the  system.  In  this paper,  we  have
outlined the building blocks for a more comprehensive  approach.  As with any change project, the time frame has
to be realistic, and coordinated with the ability of  the system to change.
Money  is  - after all  - an effective  lever  for changing  ones  mind  (and  eventually  policies and  lives  for
vulnerable  people).  Few of us spend  our money  on something we  find worthless, most of us  like the idea that
good performance  shall be rewarded.  Yet, these simple and fundamental features  guiding our private life are not
in place  in  the overall  system.  We think that  understanding  of these  fundamentals  will be driving  forces  for
change. A system-wide  change effort will not be an easy task.  Nonetheless,  international contacts have led policy
makers and system managers to become more aware of other practices, and this has fostered new attitudes with an
enthusiasm for change, which will be an asset in the years to come.
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Summary  Findings
A legacy of the command economy in Central  and  Eastern  Europe and the former
Soviet  Union  is  a social  protection system that emphasizes institutional  care for
vulnerable individuals. It  has  been well established  that in many cases institutionalization
can be more expensive per client served and  produce inferior welfare outcomes than
more inclusive approaches  designed to support individuals within their families and
communities.  But countries seeking to change the model of services face a number
of financial constraints,  including redirecting resources  away from  institutions.  How
can countries develop the new programs  in an affordable  manner?  How  should they
change the financing flows to support the new options, without putting the burden
of financing on the vulnerable themselves? The objective of this paper is  to provide
a framework to help countries re-orient their financing systems for social care. The
paper first reviews  key concepts  in social care financing and then applies them to the
problem of changing social care models  in  ECA  countries.
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